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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
Introduction
Education is a major factor in preparing our citizens to participate in
the formation of public policy. Educators in the past have stressed the
importance of reasoning ability in the application of acquired knowledge to
real life situations. Piaget (1972) and lozzi (1976) both theorized that
individuals tend to reason at more sophisticated levels in areas in which they
have more knowledge. Bolan & Nuttall (1975), found that differences in the
personal skills and the roles of the participants in community decisions
affected the outcome. The ability of government leaders and private citizens
to make accurate decisions is connected to an understanding of the decision
context.
This viewpoint has been reaffirmed by (Zeidler et al., 1992) and
Zeidler (1997) who recognize the importance of scientific literacy and the
commitment to cultivate scientific habits of mind in our students. These goals
are expressed by Projed 2061 as follows: "Scientific habits of mind can help
people in every walk of life to deal sensibly with problems that often involve
evidence, quantitative considerations, logical arguments, and uncertainty;
without the ability to think critically and independently, citizensare easy prey2
to dogamitists, flimflam artists, and purveyors of simple solutions to complex
problems." (AAAS, 1989,P. 13).
Gregory ef al. (1993) found evidence that risk perception regarding
public policy decisions was influenced by the structure and content of each
alternative. The way technical information is framed and presented can
change the reference position of some people. MacGregor (1994) identified
risk perception as a major factor in the formation of environmental policy.
Gregory & Lichtenstein (1994) found that some college students rejected
proposed new technologies even when there was a financial cost tradeoff, if
they perceived some risk to public safety or to the environment.
Satterfield & Gregory (1996) found that a majority of people are
deeply concerned about the environment, even if they do not agree with
specific policies. They found that deeply cherished environmental values of
individuals, created very complex opinions regarding public environmental
policy.It was concluded that there was often a lack of complete understand-
ing by many individuals, but when complete and clear information about
natural ecosystems was provided, some strong opinions were changed.
A person's level of science understanding defined by Zeidler (1 984a),
as "scientific literacy" was identified as a factor that influenced moral judge-
ments about environmental dilemmas. Zeidler (1982), Zeidler & Schafer
(1984), and Zeidler (1985) have suggested that scientific comprehenson, in
addif ion to a positive attitude and strong commitment toward ecology,can3
influence the level of reasoning used bysome individuals when making
social judgements about the environment.
Zeidler (1 984b) asserted that the notion of attitude must be regarded
as a framework of variables with interrelationships in the context of science
education research. He indicated the need to include intentions and behav-
iors with respect to an experience or object, in addition to themore familiar
focus on the individual's beliefs and knowledge about the specificarea of
interest. This is in agreement with the theory of reasoned action explained by
Ajzen & Fishbein (1980). They referred to the beliefs that underlie the
attitudes of an individual as behavioral beliefs. Personal beliefscan influ-
ence positive or negative intentions to perform a given behavior. A second
factor of this theory is a person's perception of socialpressure to perform or
not perform a specific behavior. This factor is referred to asan individual's
subjective norm.
Zeidler & Schafer (1984) explored the cognitive structures of individual
students when making moral judgements about public environmental
dilemmas within a social context. They examined the effects of science
content knowledge, past experience, moral reasoning ability, and attitudes,
on individual moral decisions. The subjects of the study were college age
environmental science majors (n=86) and nonscience majors (n=105). In
phase I a level of moral reasoning abilitywas established for each subject on
social and nontechnical environmental issues.4
In the second phase qualitative aspects of the discourse trends be-
Iween pairs of subjects were examined. Eleven sets ofIwosubjects with
similar affect for the environment, but with different levels of moral reasoning
about the ecological dilemmas were paired.It was concluded that the
groups of science and nonscience majors had equal abilily for general moral
reasoning. However, in response to environmental dilemmas, the science
majors exhibited higher levels of moral reasoning, and were able tosway the
moral judgements of their peers who had lower levels of moral reasoning
ability.
The dual importance of scientific and social insight is recognized by
Zeidler (1 984a), who stated, "in order to achieve the long acknowledged
goal of science literacy, it is necessary to include moral and ethical issues in
an interdisciplinary science curriculum." (p. 418). Clearly, if people are to
make informed policy decisions in a world of technology and science, they
must have an adequate understanding of both their social responsibility and
of science. A1zen & Fishbein (1980) "assume that human beingsuse or
process this information in a reasonable fashion in their attempts to cope
with their environment. Beliefs are thus viewedas underlying a persons
attitudes and subjective norms, and they ultimately determine intentions and
behavior." (p. 62)
Recent studies give additional support to the prior findings. Zeidler
(1997) examined "social thinking" and social construction of scientific5
knowledge. One important conclusion of his study was that the specific
personal beliefs a person has on any topic can contribute to fallacious ways
of thinking about that topic. Zeidler (1997) explained that, "an emphasis on
the social construction of knowledge refers to (the) role of beliefs with respect
to different social institutions" (p. 494). He listed examples of fallacious
argumentation related to social thinking by students as: "validity concerns,
naive conceptions of argument structure, effects of core beliefs on argumen-
tation, an inadequate sampling of evidence, and altering the representation
of argument and evidence" (p. 484).It is plausible to speculate that these or
similar fallacies will be found in the thinking and reasoning of adults within
the context of socio-scientific public policy development.
Zeidler's previous findings provide a basis for the present study. He
concluded that, " individuals with high moral reasoning ability generally
convinced others with lower moral reasoning ability to accept certain issues
in resolving environmental moral dilemmas as being the most important or
pertinent ones. The issues that were generally chosen were, in fact, those
issues that reflected higher stage issues. Individuals with high moral reason-
ing ability also tended to convince those with less sophisticated moral
reasoning ability to choose a particular course of action in resolving an
environmental moral dilemma" (Zeidler & Schafer, 1984 p.1 1). These
conclusions are consistent with the theories of Piaget (1972) and lozzi(1976). They are also supported by the findings of Bolan & Nuftall (1975)
and Satterfield & Gregory (1996).
Context of the Problem
In 1974 the state of California adopted new waste water standards
that forced the city of Arcata to upgrade the local sewer system. In a corn-
munity planning process, a constructed wetland was selected as an alterna-
five treatment system in place of the conventional system recommended by
state authorities. Key actors in the original planning were three professors
from Humboldt State University and Frank Klopp, the public works director
for Arcata. The professors were George Allen (fisheries), Bob Gearheart
(engineering) and Stanley Harris (wildlife management). The city council
gave approval in February 1977.
The innovative plan was initially rejected by the California Regional
Water Quality Board. That decision was appealed and state approval was
given in October 1977 for a three year pilot program. In 1979 Arcata
secured $300,000 for the pilot study. Accurate records were kept that
documented the effectiveness of the novel plan. Full approvalwas given for
the new system in July 1983, and the main system was completed in 1986.
It was less expensive, yet more effective than the mechanical treatment
system the state had originally planned.
Klopp stated in SIERRA May/June 1987, "But whatwe have really
saved is water quality." Gearheart is quoted in INSIGHT/January 16, 1989;7
"After two years of operation, it has proven to be an effective and efficient
process, producing water that exceeds the standardsand is even cleaner
than the seawater it is going into." Dissolved oxygen, suspended solids and
biochemical oxygen demand were reduced to levels at or below required
standards.It was concluded that properly constructed wetlands can remove
bacterial and viral indicators of pollution at efficiencies of 90-99%
(Gearheart et al., 1986).
Constructed wetlands are cost effective and efficient waste water
treatment systems, and can be added to or combined with existing municipal
water treatment systems. The wetland systems are much lower in costfor
construction and maintenance, and they include many side benefits. The
system built and operated by Arcata is used as a city park and alsofurnishes
habitat for numerous species of wildlife. Many people of all ages are able to
study the plants, birds, fish and other forms of life. Yet, the use of this
technology is not always adopted in some cases where it might be beneficial.
During late 1995 and 1996IwoOregon cities considered the possi-
bility of using constructed wetlands to treat some of their waste water which
could not be purified by the existing systems. Both cities were responding to
regulatory notice from the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
(DEQ), that their waste water treatment systems were inadequate and must
be upgraded. City A adopted a tentative plan to construct a wetland toupgrade their waste water treatment system. City Brejected the idea in favor
of a mechanical waste water treatmentsystem.
Definition of Terms in the Context of This Study
1.Beliefs: conventional ideas that "correspondto knowledge or informa-
tion about an object or socialnorm, principle, field of interest, specific
content, etc." (Zeidler, 1984,p. 341).
2.Values: are specific attitudes held bya person and prioritized on the
basis of his/her individual belief system.
3.Initial Core Beliefs (ICB): are subjective and deeply roofedpersonal
beliefs based on individual moralor ethical convictions (Zeidler, 1997).
4.Critical Thinking Operations (CTO): "a repertoire ofspecific (thinking)
operations, somewhere between major thinking strategiesand micro
thinking skills in their complexity and function" (Zeidleref al., 1992, p.
439).
5.Fallacious Thinking Pattern (FTP): "isany argument that purports to be
correct and is psychologically persuasive but thatproves, upon scrutiny,
to have violated some rule of logic which renders it incorrect"(Zeidler
etal., 1992, p. 440).
Statement of the Problem
The purpose of this studywas to analyze some personal beliefs and
samples of thought of the people involved in thedevelopment of the wastewater policies for City B and City A. The outcome ofone process was
opposite from the other, yet the problems of the two cities appearedto be
similar.It is recognized that local concerns suchas political and economic
interests of the citizens could have influenced the final decisions; however,
such factors were not within thescope of this study. The two local decision
processes provided a unique opportunity to explore the individual beliefs and
reasoning of each subject in the context of his/her official duty, permitting
prior theory to be tested in an actual, as opposed toa contrived setting.
Personal beliefs, individual reasoning ability, attitude toward the
environment, scientific understanding, and reasoned argumentation have all
been found to be relevant in separate past studies ofpersons when reason-
ing about socio-scientific dilemmas (Zeidler, 1 984a; Zeidler & Schafer,
1984; Zeidler et aL, 1992; Kuhn et al., 1988; Kuhn, 1991; Zeidler, 1997).
However, it has not been conclusively determined how theseconcepts might
be linked with official actions in real life settings of communityleaders during
the formation of public environmental policy. Threequestions have emerged
from a review of the current literature:
1.Can specific "critical thinking" operations be identified in the
reasoning used by each subject to explain his/her decisionre-
garding a wetland waste water treatment policy?10
2.Can any "fallacious thinking" patterns be identified in the reason-
ing used by each of the community leaders to explain his/her
decision regarding a wetland waste water treatment policy.
3.Can a pattern be identified between each subject's initial core
beliefs, and the reasoning he/she used to explain a decision
regarding a wetland waste water treatment policy?
Kuhn (1991), believes that the reasoning or thinking used by individu-
als to make udgements may be indexed by their arguments. Zeidler et al.
(1992) have stressed the importance of argumentation and discourse in
evaluating the reasoning of students in the context of socio-scientific dilem-
mas, scenarios or problems. An emphasis was placed on the particular
significance of critical thinking for people in all walks of life. Zeidler et al.
(1992) and Zeidler (1997) have also emphasized the importance of recog-
nizing thinking fallacies in student discourse and argumentation. A goal of
this research was to examine each policymaker's argument for or against the
wetland waste water treatment alternative.
Significance of the Study
In recent years much public attention has been focused on water
quality. State and Federal regulations for waste water management have
increasingly required cities and towns in the United States to upgrade their
waste water treatment systems. Costs for constructing and operating con-
ventional mechanical treatment systems are often prohibitive. James T.11
Watson a senior environmental engineer for Tennessee Valley Authorily
(TVA), estimates that towns opting for wetlands treatment systems instead of
a mechanical plant can expect to save 50 percent or more in capital costs
and on even greater percentage in ongoingexpenses (INSIGHT/January 16,
Government leaders can avoid excessive costs for providing essential
services, while still complying with environmental and health regulations. In
the early 1 970s Arcata, California began developinga constructed wetland
system for the purification of municipal waste water. Arcata's initial cost for
construction of the settling ponds and sewage wetland was only $5 million
compared to an estimated $12 million for the mechanical treatment plant.
The technology used on this project contributed toa realization that natural
or "green" treatment of secondary waste water is not only cost effective and
efficient, but has the extra benefit of preservinggreen space and wetland
ecosystems.
There is public interest in more greenspace and wetland areas.
Gregory et al. (1995) found that college students placeda monetary value
on the qualily of environmental amenities such as wildlife habitat preserva-
tion, sport fishing and hiking. A "green value"was a salient factor in their
research findings. However, wetlands treatment technologymust be better
understood by decision makers, if theuse of these systems is to be widely
accepted. Perhaps the greatest obstacle beforesewage wetlands is winning12
the confidence and support of consulting engineers who designsewage
treatment projects in the United States and abroad (World-Watch July/August
iV1;I:1I
Gregory and Slovic (1996), stated that economic impacts are an
important component of the tradeoffs that public officials must contend with.
Problems exist for evaluating the nonmonetary impacts of environmental
policy decisions. Gregory et al. (1992), argued that a better assessment of
proposed government actions could result from more clearly articulated
environmental impact statements. This study identified factors to improve
discussion and communication in environmental policy decisions and will
provide understanding of the socio-scientific dilemmas faced by public
officials.
This information may be used for planning better ways to present
decision alternatives to public policy makers to encourage a more analytical
and rational approach for solving public policy problems. Gainingmore
insight about each subject's understanding of the wetland water treatment
alternative could also be important from an educational perspective. An
analysis of each subject's core beliefs and reasoned argumentsas they relate
to a specific context will add to the knowledge base of science education.
The findings may have implications for future curriculum development to
encourage scientific habits of mind in both students and communily leaders.13
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
Decision making research is of great interest to people from diverse
professions and academic disciplines. As may be expected the research
literature is representative of this diversity in both theoretical and method-
ological focus. "From these basic strains, the study of community decision
making has evolved into something of an intellectual maelstrom, epitomized
by debate not only at the level of research design and methodology, but also
by polemics and ideology" (Bolan & Nuttall, 1975,p. 9). This statement is
as true today as it was in 1975. Each theory contains certain biases and
assumptions reflective of the purposes for which the research was intended
or the academic discipline from which it originated.
For example, economic based theories focus on improving the quality
of management decisions and they embrace assumptions that efficiencyor
correctness is the goal. Social and political based decision theories are
focused on why or how collective decisions are made and they include
assumptions that social values and norms are the driving force behind
decision behavior. Theories developed by psychologistsare focused on
conditioning and learning behavior with assumptions that decisionsare
motivated by self interest and individual survival.14
The sundry methods used in decision making research have been
shaped by the prevailing theories as well as the difficulty experienced in
isolating each aspect of decision behavior. Carroll & Johnson (1990)
classified decision models as either descriptive or prescriptive and either
alternative or attribute based. An alternative is defined as the sum total of a
certain set of attributes. Descriptive models seek to find an explanation or
understanding of a decision made by an individual or group. In compari-
son, prescriptive models strive to improve the future decisions of individuals
or groups by analyzing and changing the procedures that are used.
Early case studies of group decisions were mainly descriptive in design.
These studies led researchers to view decision behavior as a series of distinct
stages in a linear process. An outline of the basic process stages is:(1)
structuring and defining of ideas as proposals; (2) identifying alternotives; (3)
structuring of the decision field; (4) engaging in social transactions and
selecting alternatives; and (5) carrying out the decision consequences.
The process approach attracted the pragmatic interests of economists
and management scientists, and has become known as the Expected Utility
Theory. Some economists and management science theorists apply these
ideas in a prescriptive fashion in an attempt to improve the decision making
techniques of individuals or groups. Predictive ludgements are mathemati-
cally calculated to minimize the risks regarding management choices.It is
assumed that analytical reviews of each alternative will reduce the probabilityliii
of human error. Included in this paradigm is the belief that humanemotion
and affect may contribute to error in a decisionprocess.
Some researchers diverted from the assumption that decision behavior
is a highly efficient process, because human cognition is limited fora variety
of reasons. This led subsequent research in several directions. Onecorn-
mon thread that connects the various strains of decision research is the view
that risk is involved in making a decision. Numerous researchers have
explored this aspect of the decision process over the past 20years. This line
of research traces back to Expected Utility Theory, Prospect Theory and
Conflict Theory which was the focus of Janis & Mann (1977).
Galaskiewicz (1979) argued that a study of collectivepower must focus
on how decisions are made by the individual actors in the group process.
Research in the field of functional or adaptive psychology has focusedon a
rational choice perspective of decision behavior. Implicit in the rational
choice paradigm is a focus on individual cognition, and psychologists have
shown interest in this aspect of decision behavior. The study of cognition has
primarily been experimental and most research has taken place ina labora-
tory setting. A notable exception, however is the analysis of reasoned
arguments by some researchers.
By using argumentation to conceptualize the cognition used by mdi-
viduals while making decisions, a body of knowledge has been developed by
(Zeidler, 1 984a; Zeidler & Schafer, 1984; Zeidler, 1985; Kuhnet al., 1988;16
Kuhn, 1991; Zeidler et al., 1992; Zeidler, 1997). Included in this paradigm
is the connection between the causal theory used by an individual to explain
a phenomenon, and the evidence used to defend the causal theory. An
important feature of this framework is the concept of fallacious thinking
within the decision context. This review will examine this base of knowledge
as it relates to science education.
The ultimate goal is to provide a framework for the current study.
There are several studies included in this review with some relevant points
such as a person's perception of social compulsion or risk connected to a
particular course of action. A recurring theme pertinent to the study is a
suggestion of disparate cognitive modes used by individuals to make
reasoned choices. The paradigms are meant to establish a basis to extend
an investigation of reasoned action into the realm of social policy as it relates
to scientific thinking.
It should be noted that the theories and studies included in this chapter
have been selected for their relevance to reasoning in a social or an environ-
mental context. The first section gives some history about studies of group
decisions with social implications. The second section introduces some
studies and claims regarding the perception of risk by people regarding their
environmental beliefs or personal values. The third section recounts some
studies and claims made regarding scientific thinking related to social issues.17
In combination these three sections are intended to provide a basis for
further investigation.
Early Studies of Social Decision Making
Two sociologists, Bolan & Nuttall (1975) recognized a need to study
communhly decision making from a different perspective than other contem-
porary researchers from theiracademic field. They maintained a view of the
process that went beyond thestructural-functional approach which was in
vogue with sociologists at that time. Yet, they were notfully satisfied with
emerging views from other disciplines such as the popular transactional
approach from the field of political science or the biographical study of
individual political figures currently favored by psychologists.It was their
contention that the strengths of each divergent theory could be blended into
a single comprehensive framework.
Bolan & NuftalI (1975) set out to synthesize a theoretical and method-
ological design which focused on individual decision makers within the
context of their social environment. They acknowledged power and social
pressure as important factors in decision outcomes,but were also aware that
needs and attributes of individual actors could be relevant. Their theory
includes four sets of independent variables: (1) Process Roles; (2) Decision
Field Characteristics; (3) Planning and Action Strategies; (4) Issue Attributes.
The model identifies decision outcomes as dependant variables.
L_ii;]
To test their proposed new method and theory, Bolan & Nuttall (1975)
embarked on an ambitious multiplecase study of the urban decision pro-
cess. The four cases they selected were chosen for the similarily in potential
social change that each process represented. Allcases were concerned with
changes in delivery of important urban services. Two involved significant
modification of principal transportation systems in large metropolitan
centers. Another was an effort to transform a municipal school system and
the fourth was a bid to createa civic hospital center.
Municipal governing bodies were declaredas the units of study in this
research project, however four sets of variableswere defined to give a more
precise description for each of these units. Variable Set 1 includeda list of
major roles filled by actors in each group decisionprocess, combined with a
depiction of individual levels of motivation, opportunity andpersonal skills
related to the decision task.
The process roles were characterizedas 1) Community Knowledgeable,
Informant; 2) Initiator, Planner; 3) Technical Expert, Analyst;4) Expert on
Process, Strategist; 5) Public Leader; 6) Mediator, Arbitrator,Negotiator; 7)
Judge, Evaluator; 8) Possessor of Veto Power; 9) CoalitionMaker, Organizer.
Motivation and opportunity were related to private circumstancesregarding
social values or status and economic factors suchas money or free time.
Skills included group decision experience; high intelligenceand knowledge
of the issues; writing and speaking competence combined withgood inter-19
personal capability; specific experience with legal and legislative matters;
and particular social/professional contacts.
Variable Set 2 included features of the decision field specified as
characteristics of the decision environment and the decision unit. The
decision environment consisted of the formal legal structure such as govern-
ment agencies or the informal structure of private interest groups and
political partisanship. Decision unit elements included such groups as formal
legislative bodies with long standing traditions or special committees and
citizens groups which were temporarily formed. In either example the group
can be strongly influenced by prevailing social or moral values of the group
members.
Variable Set 3 involves the way information is presented, the amount
and type of information and the individuals who present it.This set of
variables is listed under two headings with three subcategories in each.
Planning strategies include planning position, which concerns the relation-
ship with a certain power center for guidance in the process. Planning
method where problems that are solved incrementally instead of comprehen-
sively are considered as less complex. The last category under this heading
is a concept of selective or strategic information in which planners focus on
immediate results instead of long term goals.
Action strategies relate to the amount of disturbance to the status quo
such as distribution of resources, behavior of individuals or society in20
general, and basic organization of principal institutions.It was hypothesized
that vast changes to existing conditions would meet with greater resistance
than actions which caused less disturbance to the statusquo.
Variable Set 4 contains six variables associated with the public agenda.
The degree of ideology in a proposed change is the first in this set, with
action being less likely as ideological content increases. Next is the number
of people impacted and the degree of personal gain or loss they anticipate
from a proposed change. Third is whether an action is considered flexibleor
inflexible over time, with inflexibility being associated with a choice for
inaction. Fourth is the focus of action programming, which is related to the
complexity of implementation. Fifth is the amount of perceived risk or
uncertainty, with low risk supporting decisions for change. Last is the level of
difficulty in communicating the features of the proposed change. If the
concepts are easily understood and conveyed to others, they are considered
more inclined to favor a decision of action.
Bolan & NultalI (1975) employed a series of steps to describe the
community decision process, which is similar to the classical model for study
of individual decision behavior. These steps are:1) structuring and defining
ideas as proposals; 2) identifying alternatives; 3) structuring the decision
field; 4) engaging in social decision-making transactions; and 5) carrying out
the consequences of the process (p. 23). They consider these steps to be
idealized in either the individual or group process, but stilla serviceable21
component for a rational attempt to analyze decisions. They also contend
that these steps have greater significance for thegroup process because of
the intrinsic social interaction in a collective decision.
The dependant variable in this model is the decision outcome, which
may be more complicated than a simple acceptance or rejection of a pro-
posal. Often there are compromises or modified proposals for various
dimensions of the choices being considered. For example, themeans to
achieve a goal is viewed as different from the original goal. To deal with
this, each of these Iwo dimensions is representedon a continuum between
total acceptance and total rejection. The outcome is graphically shown with
the goal position on a horizontal axis and themeans to achieve on a vertical
ax's.
OnlyIwoof the four variable sets were used in the original study. Set 1
(The Properties of Process Roles) and Set 2 (Decision Field Variables)were
selected because the four cases had less similarily in these than in Variable
Sets 3 and 4. The cases were chosen initially because theywere in fad
similar in the characteristics represented by Set 3 (Planning Methods andSet
4 (Issue Attributes). The researchers believed this arrangement would allow
for more understanding of the correlation between Variable Sets 1 and2
and the decision outcomes.
Bolan & Nuttall (1975) recognized that the projectwas at best a
qualitative test of their theory and that only general tendencies might be22
identified. They aspired to use quantitative measures to link the dependant
variable to such independent variables as the degree of influence from
specific individuals or organizations. They were interested to learn of the
perception individual decision makers had of their own role, the roles played
by other persons and the sequence of events which led to the final outcome
of the community decision process.
To accomplish this, interviews were used to begin gathering data. The
selection of interviewees initially began with lists of names from such sources
as newspaper articles, reports, files and minutes of meetings. As the study
progressed, more subjects were added to the list of interviewees if they were
reputed by their peers as important members of the community decision
process. The purpose of this was to learn how the decision process was
perceived by the participants and not just by making assumptions from
official public records. This sampling method was quite effective because
actors in the process were judged by both allies and opponents who were
interacting with them.
The interviews consisted ofIwoparts, first information was collected
regarding the person's reason for participating in the decision process and
intensity of this participation. Questions were asked to determine whether
their involvement was part of their regular job or as a community volunteer.
Their level of intensity was measured by the number of hours they spent23
during various phases of the total process and they were questioned about
their perceptions of the roles played by other participants in the process.
An additional part of each interview was a questionnaire used to gain
information for quantitative analysis. To gather this data three ratio scales
were devised by the researchers, but no reference was made to a validation
process. First each interviewee was asked to rate all organizations involved
in the decision process on nine attributes related to variable set 2. The
organizations of all individuals were given a value of 100 for each attribute
and the person was then asked to proportionally rate the same attribute of
every other organization in comparison.
A second scale was provided for eight personal skills of 20 to 30 other
individuals who were known to be involved in the decision process. For this
data set the person was asked to compare his or her own ability with the
ability of every other person being rated. Again the base value was 100 for
each skill of the respondent and a ratio value was used to express the
perception they had for the skills of the others they rated. For example 200
represented twice as much ability and 50 represented half as much ability.
The last scale had seven points which represented verbal phrases
describing the respondent's perception of other actors in the process. These
phrases were based on the following social and affective considerations:1)
acquaintanceship with them, 2) like or dislike of them, 3) their importance to
the issue, 4) their position on the issue. A low numerical rating meant less24
importance and less agreement with the position of the other person and
high numerical ratings meant more importance and more agreement with
the position of the person.
From the four case studies, 135 people were interviewed and 62
returned completed questionnaires. A variety of techniques were used to
analyze the data (see Bolan & Nuttallpp. 80-120). Findings of the study
identified 11 variables which played an important part in the four cases.
Four were from the role variables, three were from the skill variables and
four were from the organizational attributes.It was concluded that the
motivation and opportunity variables did not play a part. A general ranking
in order of importance was: 1) Roles, 2) Skills, 3) Organizational Attributes.
Hammond (1955) began modification of the theory knownas Probabil-
istic Functionalism conceived by Brunswik (1952, 1955, 1956). This line of
decision research began in the early 1 930s and continues today. The
concepts of Brunswik's theory were combined in his "Lens Model," which was
created as a device to represent both the internal and external factors that
influence human judgement and decision making. The modelwas of minor
interest to scholars until Hammond began building on Brunswik's ideas.
The concept of probabilistic functionalism was proposed by Egon
Brunswik (1952) as a result of his life's work as a research psychologist. A
notable aspect of his theory was the notion of representative design which he
argued is a necessary requirement for any study of human behavior.25
Pertinent to this notion is his contention that behavior is alwayssome form of
an organism's interaction with its environment. He believed that the environ-
ment consists of variables such as other organisms, objects and events.
These variables were categorized by the region in which they relate to the
organism.
Brunswik (1952) developed a research method known as the "Lens
Model" which reflects the possible impact of environmental criteriaon
observed behavior. He argued that representative design isan essential step
beyond the more simplistic research designs that attempt to linkone cause to
one effect. He employed the term "regional reference" was to describe the
location of a variable relative to the behaving organism.
A variable may be distal which means it is deeply hidden in time or
location with relation to the individual being studied.If the variable is an
object which is easily measured it is considered overt, but if it issome intan-
gible concept or idea and cannot be directly observed or measured it isa
covert variable. In order to investigate the environment of each organismor
individual, the researcher must identify both overt and covert distal variables.
The next layer of the individual's environment is the location of proxi-
mal variables. These proximal variables are directly connected with the
sensory surface of the behaving organism. The central region of the envi-
ronment is regarded as the internal portion where individual attitudes,
motivation, intelligence, etc are found. Brunswik (1952) argued that other26
contemporary theories and research methods were incomplete becauseno
allowances were made for possible effects of the distal variables fora
complete depiction of the environment.
In order to interact with an ambiguous environment, complex organ-
isms such as humans use multiple ecological cues to function in uncertain
situations. With this line of reasoning it is thought that cue-object relation-
ships are not clear cut, which makes it necessary for vicarious mediation of
many cues through the layers of the environment.It is also postulated that a
comprehensive perception of the environment may be induced by several
partial causes with less than perfect correlations. These factorsmay contrib-
ute to the causal texture of the environment. In order to sort out this complex
behavior, Brunswik (1952) and Hammond (1966) believed that research
must focus on the specific cues used by each individual to discern the distal
as well as the proximal variables in the environment.
Through the combined efforts of Hammond (1955), Smedslund (1955),
Hoffman (1960) Hursch ef al. (1964), Tucker (1964), Hammond et al.
(1966) and Hammond efal. (1975) a cognitive paradigm knownas Social
Judgement Theory (SiT) was synthesized. Brehmer (1979) continued build-
ing on the axioms of SiT with a focus on theoretical and methodological
improvement. The Lens Model and the concept of representative designare
now regarded by some researchers as very worthwhile and an important step
toward the development of more rigorous methods for the study of human":4
behavior. The research methodology contained in the Lens Model of SiT
provides a range of formulas to profile individual cognitive patterns within
some very specific decision contexts and environments.
Janis & Mann (1977) and Janis (1982) argued that people experience
some level of psychological stress while making an important decision. The
stress caused decision makers either individually or as a group to falter in the
cognitive processing of information that was pertinent to high quality deci-
sion making procedures. They identified seven major criteria that must be
satisfied to attain high quality decisions for the achievement of multiple long-
term objectives. The seven ideal criteria were the following:
The decision maker, to the best of his ability and within his information-
processing capabilities
1.thoroughly canvases a wide range of alternative courses of action;
2.surveys the full range of objectives to be fulfilled and the values
implicated by the choice;
3.carefully weighs whatever he knows about the costs and risks of
negative consequences, as well as the positive consequences, that
could flow from each alternative;
4.intensively searches for new information relevant to further
evaluation of the alternatives;
5.correctly assimilates and takes account of any new information
or expert judgement to which he is exposed, even when theinformation or judgement does not support the course of action
he initially prefers;
6.reexamines the positive and negative consequences of all known
alternatives, including those originally regarded as unacceptable,
before making a final choice;
7.makes detailed provisions for implementing or executing the
chosen course of action, with special alfention to contingency
plans that might be required if various known risks were to
materialize (Janis & Mann, 1977, p.11).
Janis & Mann (1977) assumed that failure to meet any of the criteria
resulted in a defedive decision with possible setbacks or post decisional
regret. They theorized that in order for decision makers to avoid serious
miscalculations, "vigilant information processing" must occur, and that the
more adequately each of the seven criteria is met, the less likely immediate
objedives and long-term values would be jeopardized. An important
component of their theory was that the stress experienced while important
decisions are being made is caused by certain decisional conflids. Janis and
Mann (1977) believed that conflids generate feelings of distress that are
displayed as hesitation, vacillation or uncertainty over alternative courses of
adion.29
Some possible sources of decisional conflictwere believed to be:
First, any situation where the decision makerexpects to gain or lose social or
self-approval as a result of the alternative selected; and also,whether
something of significant utilitarian value is at risk. Second, if theperson has
made some level of commitment toa certain course of action, but discovers
new information regarding possible opportunities or threats which promptsa
different choice. Third, if all available choicessuggest serious risks, and cues
provide little hope for findinga satisfactory alternative. Fourth, when con-
spicuous cues suggest that serious losses cannot be avoided because insuffi-
cient time is available to find amore satisfactory course of action.
The fifth type of stress is the only situation described by conflict theory
as suitable for optimal coping behavior.It is assumed that this occurs when
the person is challenged by the situation, yet also expectsa satisfactory
resolution. The first four situations are believed to foster copingpatterns that
can have undesirable consequences. The last situation is presumed to have
a moderate degree of stress that motivates the individual to find a good
solution for the dilemma.
Five basic coping patterns are linked to the five sets ofcircumstances
as people react to the stress or decisional conflict. The theory does not
discount other possible grounds forerror in important decisions such as
political or other group pressures, organizational constraints,information
overload, prejudice, human limits in ability toprocess information and30
ignorance regarding pertinent fads. However, the major cause of most
serious errors is regarded as some attempt to avoid the stress related to each
situation.
Of the five coping patterns the first four are generally regarded as
maladaptive if vital choices are being made. In some cases with minor or
routine decisions a savings in time, effort or emotional stress may result from
one of the flawed coping patterns, but usually it will increase the chance of
error. The four defective patterns are labeled unconflided adherence,
unconflided change, defensive avoidance and hypervigilance. The fifth
pattern, which is perceived as adaptive coping behavior, is termed vigilance.
The presence or absence of the following three conditions is associ-
ated with the coping pattern which may be employed by each person at any
particular time.If the person believes there is:1) serious risk with each
alternative being considered, 2) hope of finding a better alternative or 3)
enough time for further search and deliberation before the final choice must
be made.
These concepts were explored by Janis & Rausch (1970), who de-
signed a field study to investigate the coping modes of college men who
were opposed to the Vietnam War. The subjeds of the study were students of
Yale University who were resisting the military draft. The researchers wanted
to identify the relationship between the various decisional stands taken by the
students, and whether they preferred the communication of information that31
was favorable or unfavorable. Antidraft pledges were being declared in
writing; then circulated and signed by hundreds of students.
Civil disobedience was escalating rapidly and the moralily of the war
was being questioned by many people. Some religious and political leaders
were critical of the country's involvement in the war and were asking for
support from the students. The newspapers were regularly publishing the
antiwar pledges with the names of the signers. Controversy was at a high
level over the political and legal aspects of the resistance movement. The
adherence of the students to their public pledges constituted a high level of
risk for them. Their future careers and continued education were bound to
be impacted by the moral positions they chose to take.
The purpose of the study was to discover the variables that had a
mediating effect on the tendency of the subjects to accept or reject opposing
communication about the antiwar controversy. The goal was to specify
whether the coping behavior of each student was avoidance or vigilance. An
important consideration was to find the function of how this variation of
interest in positive or negative information changed in relation to the way
each man had decided to participate in the draft resistance movement.
Sixty-two men were given a standardized interview which was used to
classify them into four groups. Group (1) had signed a We-Won't-Go
pledge, which was published with their names in the local newspaper; group
(2) were potential signers who had not made up their minds; group (3) had32
been undecided about signing, but then declined; group (4) never consid-
ered signing. After their interviews the subleds were asked to read a 50
word summary of each position; they were then asked about their interest in
reading four pro-draft and four anti-draft articles. They were then asked to
read two six hundred word articles, one for and one against, the resistance
movement.
As the resistance level of the groups increased the difference in each
group's agreement with the Iwo articles widened. The group with the
strongest commitment to the draft resistance, had both the strongest agree-
ment with the anti-draft article and the strongest disagreement with the
article in favor of the draft. The magnitude of agreement and disagreement
became progressively less as each group's level of draft resistance declined
toward an almost neutral rating for both articles by the group which had
never considered signing the pledge.
When decisions are made in a coping mode of vigilance it is believed
that the level of stress or conflict is moderately high, but not so intense that
the cognitive processes are impaired. In this mode the level of stress can
fluctuate moderately and a medium to high rate of vacillation between
alternatives is often observed. Other conditions necessary to foster vigilance
are the perception of serious risk from the current situation and from other
courses of action under consideration.It must also be the conviction of the33
decision makers that a better solution may be found and that there is enough
time to find it.
Two of the four maladaptive coping patterns occurred under condi-
tions of low stress with no vacillation between choices. These patternsare
unconflided adherence and unconflicted change. With unconflicted adher-
ence there in no perception of risk from the current course of action. In the
pattern of unconflicted change there is a perception of risk from the current
course action, but no risk is perceived from the proposed change.
Hypervigilance is accompanied by persistent anxiety and high stress.
The amount of vacillation between alternatives in usually very great. High
risk is perceived from the current course of action as wellas all alternatives
under consideration. The person believes there is a possibility of a better
choice, but believes there is not enough time to find it.In this case the
processing of information and other decision behavior may reach a state of
panic. This pattern is often connected with crisis situations such as during
natural disasters or with medical decisions, where severe personal lossmay
result from any decision. However, in the case of public decisions, hyper-
vigilance is not as common as the pattern of defensive avoidance.
The conditions which foster defensive avoidance are typical inmany
facets of everyday life. Janis & Mann (1977) list the two essential mediating
conditions as:(1) the decision maker is in a state of relatively high decisional
conflict resulting fromtwoclashing types of threat that makeifimpossible for34
him to adopt any easy resolution, and (2) he has lost hope of finding a
solution better than the defedive ones he is considering.
The antecedent conditions for the loss of hope may include cues from
any of the following: (1) a trustworthy expert's judgement that all the avail-
able information has already been obtained by the decision maker, (2)
markedly diminishing returns from prolonged information search, indicating
that the information supply has been exhausted, (3) impressive warnings
about unacceptable losses from adopting any of the proposed alternatives,
and (4) a consensus of pessimism among those from whom the decision
maker seeks advice about arriving at any promising new ways to resolve the
conflict.
Depending on how the decision environment is perceived by an
individual, defensive avoidance behavior may be manifest as either procras-
tination, shifting of responsibility, or bolstering one of the alternative solu-
tions being considered. Any one of the three forms is believed to be an
attempt to escape the stress which may result from being caught between two
sources of threat. While it is possible that personality traits may influence the
form of defensive avoidance, the main determinants are the situational
variables.
If the person believes that a decision may be postponed as away to
escape the feeling of distress, then procrastination occurs. The amount of
perceived risk from postponing action is a major determinant for this form of35
defensive avoidance.If the person believes there will be no penalty for an
indefinite delay, then attention will be given to other matters involving less
stress.In this event, an individual will not speak or think about the matter,
and will avoid social situations where this might be expected.
On the other hand, if the decision can be passed on to someone else,
then avoidance of the decisional conflict might take the form of shifting the
responsibility. In this circumstance a person may begin to rationalize that
other individuals such as colleagues or family members should make the
decision. Attempts to get others involved will be made on the pretense that
they are more qualified to make the decision or that someone else should
take the blame for any negative consequences.
Bolstering an alternative may occur if the decision maker believes
there is no way to avoid the decisional conflict by shifting responsibility or
procrastinating. With this form of avoidance, the least objedionable alterna-
tive is bolstered by exaggeration of the desirable attributes. Information that
is being processed by the person will be distorted and selective. All other
alternatives are dismissed as unacceptable and any negative aspects of the
chosen alternative are minimized. The person's thoughts and discussion of
the topic will be biased in favor of the positive consequences for adopting the
selected alternative.
Festinger (1957, 1964) recognized bolstering as an integral compo-
nent of decisional behavior, but believes it to be related to inconsistent36
cognition regarding the alternatives. He assumes that cognitive dissonance
always follows a decision, because certain aspects related to the choice
become more obvious after the selection has been made. He surmises that
when this occurs, the attractiveness of the chosen alternative is magnified,
while the desirability of the other choices is diminished.
Mann and Taylor (1970) found some evidence of predecisional
bolstering, vigilant information processing and defensive avoidance in an
experimental study. A real-life choice situation was modeled as a decision
such as consumers make when shopping for a household object. The
decisions were to involve a variety of art styles with no real value, but it was
assumed that the subjects would take personal pride in the choices they
made. The researchers also believed that a mild threat to the self esteem of
the subjects was possible, because of possible differences in the artistic tastes
of their friends and relatives.
Six groups of 19 female college students were asked to rate a set of
12 art prints. After the ratings were made, each woman in five of the groups
was shown a pair of the prints and told that she could keep one of them.
The subjects from three of the groups were asked to make a difficult choice
between pairs of art prints which they had rated almost equally. The subjects
inIwogroups were given easy choices between Iwo prints which they had
rated very unequally. The sixth group was a control group, and those
subjects were not offered the choice of a print to take home.37
Decisional conflict was created at unequal levels for the subjects by
varying the difficulty of the choices. One group was told that the choice was
revocable, and that they could take their selected art home for a few days.
Then, if their minds changed, it could be returned and exchanged for the
other print. The second group was told that the choice was irrevocable and
the sub jects were asked to sign for the print. The third group was given an
irrevocable choice and asked to write a 200 word essay to justify the choice.
For the two groups with easy choices, one was given the revocable option,
and the other the irrevocable option.
The results of the study showed that theIwogroups with the easy
choices experienced little or no decisional conflict, and the subjects made the
choices faster than most of the other subjects. For the group with the easy
and revocable choice, the mean for the decision time was 2.8 seconds, and
the predecisional bolstering mean was 0.50. For the group with the irrevo-
cable easy choice, the mean decision time was 7.8 seconds, and the mean
for predecisional bolstering was .00. The control group made no choice, but
they had a predecisional bolstering mean of 0.25. In the control group, the
subjects showed no sign of decisional conflict.
For the three groups with the difficult choice, there was some deci-
sional conflict observed. For the subjects with the revocable choice, the
mean decision time was 7.0 seconds, and the group mean for predecisional
bolstering was 1 .11. The researchers observed a degree of defensivecI&
avoidance in this group. The mean decision time for the group with the
irrevocable choice was 13.1 seconds, and the predecisional bolstering mean
was 1.40. A minimal level of vigilance was observed in this group. There
was a moderate level of vigilance observed in the group with the irrevocable
choice, and the requirement to justify the choice. The mean decision time
was 24.9 seconds, and the predecisional bolstering mean was 0.70.
Janis & Mann (1977) incorporated the phenomenon of bolstering into
Conflict Theory with a different perspective than some other researchers.
They assume that the motivation for bolstering is defensive avoidance as
previously described and is not cognitive dissonance. They also argue that
bolstering may occur before as well as after a commitment has been made
to an alternative. While some researchers disagree with cause of bolstering,
most agree that some process of cognitive restructuring occurs.
Janis & Mann (1977) identified six rationalization palferns that
individuals often use in cognitive restructuring while making important
decisions. The basis of bolstering is assumed to be a set of defensive beliefs
which may be quite obvious or very subtle in the way they are manifest by the
person. They are labeled as:1) exaggerating favorable consequences, 2)
minimizing unfavorable consequences, 3) denying aversive feelings, 4)
exaggerating the remoteness of action commitment, 5) minimizing social
surveillance, and 6) minimizing personal responsibility.39
The first two tactics are quite obvious and need little explanation.
However, detection of other defensive beliefs is more difficult and requires
further interpretation.If undesirable consequences cannot be denied, then
the decision maker might argue that they are attractive or desirable because
of some other ideology or value system. In this situation the decisional
conflict is minimized by tactic number three, denying aversive feelings. In the
case of tactic number four, exaggerating the remoteness of action commit-
ment, the presumption is made that no action on the decision will be re-
quired in the foreseeable future.
Tactic number five, minimizing social surveillance, is a mental distor-
tion that other people will not know or will not care about the action or
choice that the individual is about to make. The last bolstering tactic in the
list, is minimizing of personal responsibility, and it should not be confused
with the form of defensive avoidance labeled as shifting of responsibility. In
the former, the person admits that the choice is his, but attributes the reason
for the choice to social pressure from others. With the latter, the actual
decision is passed on to another person.
Janis (1972, 1983) identified and described a collective form of
defensive avoidance which he labeled "groupthink." This is a situation
where defective decisions sometimes result from strong social pressure for
the unanimous support of a certain course of action. In this condition it is
still assumed that the individuals involved in the group may respond with any40
of the coping styles contained in the conflict model, but the pressure to
conform is in much greater proportion. The groups that are the most
vulnerable to groupthink are moderately to highly cohesive where the
members share a strong need for affiliation.
It is believed that when groupthink occurs in highly cohesive groups
with concurrence-seeking tendencies, bolstering is often manifest. The
concept is an extension of the earlier theories that describe strategies of
consensus building among individuals and groups that share influence and
power in the context of a specific decision environment. When the personal
biases or irrational beliefs of a strong leader are collectively embraced by a
cohesive group of decision makers, it is highly probable that some serious
errors in judgement will occur. One major point of this ideology is that vital
decisions in the real world are often less than optimal with regard to radical
changes in policy.
In a review of five case studies, Janis (1983) found some compelling
evidence supporting the notion of a groupthink syndrome. These represen-
tative cases were selected because they exhibit the group conditions that he
believes foster the flawed decision styles postulated in conflict theory. All five
cases have been widely recognized as bad decisions made at a high level in
the government of the United States. In each case a fiasco resulted that
caused a high degree of regret for those who were involved in the decision41
process. A brief summary of some representative case studies will give more
clarify to the components of conflict theory described above.
A classic example of the groupthink syndrome is the decision made by
President John F. Kennedy and his close advisors to invade Cuba. In a case
study of this decision, known as the Bay of Pigs incident, Janis (1972, 1983)
identifies six major miscalculations, that were the result of assumptions made
by highly intelligent, yet misinformed men. In retrospect, all six of the
assumptions were based on very irrational thinking and faulty planning. A
form of bolstering was also present in the group, and it was manifest as
reassurance by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that the plan of action
had very little risk of failure.
The six assumption were:1) most people will believe the CIA's cover
story and no one will know what really happened; 2) the Cuban air force
was weak and could be destroyed before the invasion; 3) the 1400 Cuban
exiles who were to make the invasion had high morale, and would not want
support from troops of the United States; 4) Castro's army was weak and
small; 5) the invasion would start an internal revolt against Castro that would
support the efforts to overthrow Castro. All of these assumptions were not
based on any facts, but were bolstered and affirmed by Kennedy's advisors.
When the invasion failed, the official explanation placed the blame for
the failure on the following four factors.First, the invasion plan was derived
from political thinking and not military strategy. Second, thenew Kennedy42
administration was not yet in harmony with the existing bureaucracy. Third,
the secret nature of the mission had excluded the experts from the planning
process. Fourth, the policy-makers were reluctant to openly oppose the high
level leaders because it might damage their personal status. Janis (1983)
does not agree that these four factors fully explain the miscalculations.
The rationale that Janis (1983) gives after reviewing some authorita-
tive accounts of the Bay of Pigs decision is not meant to replace the four
factors of the official explanation. Instead he identifies other symptoms that
indicate the possible presence of a groupthink syndrome. There was an
illusion that Castro's forces were weak and that the opposing forces were
invulnerable. The policy-makers believed that the enemy was incompetent
and immoral, while the resistance forces were fighting for democracy and
against communism. Therefore, any person who spoke against the invasion
plan was not showing support for the moral purpose and goals of thegroup.
There was also an illusion of unanimity and mutual respect for the
opinions of the group members. Critical individual thinking was replaced by
a consensual validation of the leader and the plan that he favored. Personal
doubts were suppressed and some members of the group had fear of
possible disapproval from the leaders and the other members. Social
pressure was put on any doubtful group members by self-appointed mind-
guards, to say nothing that might discourage the leaders. The group agenda
was manipulated to prevent any open discussion of dissenting views about43
the proposed invasion plan. A taboo was created against antagonizing
valued new members of the Kennedy administration.
Janis & Mann (1977) identified the following eight major symptomsas
indications for groupthink to be exhibited:1) a collective illusion of invulner-
ability; 2) collective efforts to rationalize in order to discount warnings; 3)an
unquestioned belief in the inherent morality of the group; 4) stereotyped
negative views of rivals; 5) direct pressure on any member who expresses
dissenting views or arguments; 6) self-censorship of doubtsor deviations
from group consensus; 7) a shared illusion of unanimity and falseassump-
tion that silence implies consent; 8) the emergence of self-appointedmem-
bers who protect the group from adverse information which threatens the
complacency of the group.
The symptoms of groupthink postulated by Conflict Theory closely
match the group dynamics observed in reviews of the policy decisions for the
Bay of Pigs invasion. Janis (1983) analyzed the Kennedy administration's
decision procedure in another important foreign policy-makingprocess
known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. This crisis was handled by essentially the
same group of leaders, but the outcome was recognized as much more
effective than the Bay of Pigs incident that had occurred justover a year
earlier. Janis (1983), believes this comparison isan extraordinary counter-
point to use as further evidence of the groupthink syndrome. President
Kennedy made four important procedural changes after his earlier mistakes44
had been recognized. First, he redefined the roles of the participantsas
critical thinkers in the decision process. Instead of thegroup members
confining their comments to theareas of their own specialty, they were
expected to become skeptical generalists, and examine each problemas a
whole. He also appointed his two most trusted advisors to become the
devil's advocates, and relentlessly pursue every asped of contention in order
to prevent mistakes from a superficial analysis of the issues.
The atmosphere of the group was changed by organizing the meet-
ings in a completely different way. A formal agenda was not followed,
instead, frank and open discussions were encouraged. New advisors and
outside experts were routinely introduce in order to obtain fresh points of
view. Critical thinking was facilitated by breaking up the executive committee
into subgroups, then debates were encouraged among thegroups when they
joined together again. President Kennedy was intentionally absent from
some meetings to allow the committee to conceptualize the problems without
undue influence from his presence.
There is evidence that groupthink was avoided, anda new group
norm was established by the procedural changes that Kennedy made. The
group experienced a high level of stress and a great deal of sub jedive
discomfort during the policy planning period, yet thegroup members were
all very cautious about rationalizing in order to speedup the process. ThisLi1
vigilant appraisal of the situation is a sharp contrast to the attitude of invul-
nerabilify that was present in the Bay of Pigs decision process.
Janis (1983), found four general charaderistics that were manifest in
the process for the Cuban Missile Crisis that indicate vigilant appraisal
instead of the concurrence-seeking behavior of the Bay of Pigs decision.
First, was recognition by the group members that grave dangers existed,
even after the plan of action was decided. Second, was the explicit and
dired discussions of the morale issues connected with the decision alterna-
fives. Third, was the open manner that each member used to express the
confusion and indecisiveness they felt when trying to reach an acceptable
balance of all pertinent aspeds. Fourth, was a strong commitment and
resolve by the group members to adhere to the policies as they were imple-
mented.
The concept of a contextual perception of the choices, when decisions
are being made by individuals, is described by Yates (1980) as affedive
versus cognitive encoding. Dawes (1988) describes this mental representa-
tion of decision alternatives as framing, where associations are made with
something in the context of the situation, which serves as a reminder of past
learning and experience. This cognitive image or framing of the summaries
of the person's past experience and knowledge are described by Beach
(1990) as a value image, which includes a combination of values, standards,46
ideals, precepts, beliefs, morals and ethics. He also definesa trajectory
image as a set of abstract and concrete goals for an ideal future.
Studies of Risk Perception and Environmental Values
Hogarth (1980) maintained that evaluations and predictions are
major parts of decision making behavior. He believes that, on the basis of
belief and preference, people give meaning to information, and that it is
essential to understand the way individuals conceptualize the world in order
to perceive their anticipation of each decision milieu. Gregory and his
colleagues depict an individual's perception in relation to public policy and
environmental issues as closely connected to the cognitive concepts of mental
images and framing of decision alternatives described by Yates (1980),
Dawes (1988), and Beach (1990).
Gregory et al. (1993), explored the mental points of reference that
individuals use to decide whether to support or reject policy alternatives. The
focus of their study was to measure the effects of the framing of alternatives
as either restoration of a loss, or as a gain when, when compared with the
current conditions. They hypothesized "that an improvement program that is
framed in terms of returning to an earlier, belfer status will be evaluated
more favorably than will an otherwise identical program that is framed
around the current status." (Gregory et al.,p. 197, 1 993).
Decision problems were selected for two domains that the researchers
considered important areas of public concern. In the context of these47
domains, realistic policies were designed to propose changes in health and
in the availability of environmental goods. Six pairs of statements were
designed to reflect a possible change. In each pair, one was framed with
reference to the present and one was framed with reference to the past. In
each pair, both changes were the same regarding the proposed improve-
ment, except for the difference in reference to the status quo. Each respon-
dent was asked to rate the desirabilily of the change on a seven point scale,
with least desirable "1° and most desirable "7".
The statements in the present form were simply proposals for a
change from a present condition to a better condition, but with a tradeoff or
cost for the change. The tradeoff was the same in each pair, but in the past
form information was included regarding a past condition that was actually
equal to the present condition, yet it was framed as the restoration to a past
state. This totaled 12 policy problems from the six areas. Three of the
problem areas were realistic and three were fictional. Just one question was
asked of each subject along with a short description of the proposed change.
The 983 volunteers for this study were recruited from the community of
Eugene, Oregon, and the majority were students form the University of
Oregon.
The first fictional problem concerned pollution of the atmosphere from
manufacturing detergents and soaps. In the present form the Detergent
problem was whether the subjects supported a policy that would reduce thepollution by 15 percent at a cost increase of ten percent. The past form used
the same cost increase, but framed the reduction in pollution as a return to
levels of the past. For this problem, 44 subjects were given the present form
of the question, and 43 were given the past form. The subjects in both
groups were asked to evaluate their respective policy options on the seven
point scale described above. The group mean for those sub jects who rated
the present form was 5.02 with a standard deviation of 1.45. The group
mean for the past form was 6.14 with a standard deviation of 0.77. The t-
score was 4.46 p.Ol.
The second fictional problem area was Public Health where a hypo-
thetical infectious disease was blamed for the deaths of 143 children in
1989. The decision was whether to spend limited funds for a vaccination
program. The question in the present form was framed as an elimination of
the disease by two years in the future. The past form was framed as a
restoration to a prior status, before the disease first appeared. For this
problem, 46 subjects were given the present form of the question, and 45
were given the past form. The group mean for the subjects who rated the
present form was 4.13 with a standard deviation of 1 .49. The group mean
for the subjects who rated past form was 5.47 with a standard deviation of
1 .25. The t-score was 4.63 p=.Ol.
The third fictional pair of questions concerned an Operation problem
regarding two hospitals with different failure rates for operations. In thepresent form the question was framed as a possible change from the hospi-
tal with the low success rate to the one with the better rate. The past form
reversed the scenario to a move from the better hospital to the one with the
lower success rate. For this problem, 92 subjects were given the present
form of the question, and 91 were given the past form. The group mean for
the subjects who rated the present form was 4.11 with a standard deviation
of 2.20. The group mean for the sublects who rated the past form was 4.93
with a standard deviation of 2.02. The I-score was 2.64 p=.Ol.
The information included in each realistic area in reference to the past
was actually a true description of a past condition in each problem area.
River, Air and Auto were the realistic areas. For the three realistic areas, it
was found that the information given in the past form questions was already
familiar to the subjeds. New facts were not presented for the realistic areas,
but the information already known to the subjects was only emphasized for
the past form.
The Auto problem area was treated as a control by including some
past information about conditions which were actually worse than the present
state in addition to a general reference to the clean air of the past. The
reasoning for this was that if the old condition was used as a reference point,
the proposed change would be rated less favorable by the Present group.
The results, however, indicated that when this prior state was added there
was no effect. For this problem, 89 subjects were given the present form of50
the question, and 67 were given the past form. The group mean for the
subjects who rated the present form was 5.43 with a standard deviation of
1.54. The group mean for the subjects who rated the past form was 5.22
with a standard deviation of 1.82. The f-score was 0.75.
For the River problem, 101 subjects were given the present formof the
question, and 98 were given the past form. The group mean forthe subjects
who rated the present form was 5.67 with a standard deviation of 1.32.The
group mean for the subjectswho rated the past form was 6.02 with a
standard deviation of 1.06. The f-score was 2.04 p=.O5. For the Air
problem, 135 subjects were given the present form and 132 were giventhe
past form. The group mean for the subjectswho rated the present form was
4.74 with a standard deviation of 1.79. The group mean for thesubjects
who rated the past form was 5.19 with a standard deviation of 1.82.The t-
score was 2.03 p=.O5. Forthe past and the present forms of the six prob-
lems a possible improvement was proposed at some cost. All ratings were
based on the seven point scale described above, with 1 representingthe least
desirability and 7 representing the most desirability.
The researchers concluded that their predictions were correct and in
accordance with the premises of prospect theory.It was found that the
subjects responding to the past forms of the River and Air problems gave
significantly higher desirability ratings than those for the present forms of
theseIwoproblem areas. Both forms of the Auto problem had no significant51
difference in ratings. The areas of River and Air suggested different refer-
ence points on the basis of whether or not the proposed improvements were
viewed as the restoration of a loss, but because the past form of the Auto
problem actually described a worse condition, the reference point appeared
to be the same as for the present form.
For the fictional problem areas of Detergents, Operations and Public
Health, the contrast between past and present forms was greater than in the
Iworealistic problems for Air and Water.It was surmised that this was
because some subjects from the present forms of theIworealistic areas
might have used their own prior knowledge of the past status to frame the
problem. This however, was not intended by the design of the study.
The results of the study show evidence that a cursory choice of words
to express the values for policy alternatives, can shift the reference position of
some people.It also suggests that these underlying values may not be
clearly structured until information is actually sought by policy makers. It
appears that minor changes in wording can elicit significantly different
perceptions of the same problem. Public policy makers might wish to learn
what the public's perception and values are regarding important issues yet
be unaware that shifts can be caused unintentionally by the way a problem is
structured.
It is believed that a major component of the public concerns about
policy changes is risk perception. MacGregor (1994) contrastsIwoview-52
points regarding risk communication in the context of community relations.
First is the form and content, which he states is a matter of providing under-
standable technical information. This is usually done by experts and is
primarily educational. Often there is an attempt to minimize risks and
convince the public that risks are small. This process createsopen communi-
cation, but does not usually empower members of the public to participate in
policy changes.
The other viewpoint is described by MacGregor (1994) as "what the
public typically expeds would be done in a normal and appropriateprocess
for managing anything in society" (MacGregor, 1994,p. 5). He argues that
for risk management by policy makers it is important to consider the public's
perception of risk based on social norms and values even when these might
have little or nothing to do with technical assessment of the risks. Often the
quantified and technical factors that define risk for expertsare much different
from the social and psychological attitudes that are held by members of
society who have no expert knowledge. These feelings of inexperienced
people regarding risks and benefits are frequently measured in the context of
their own experience.
A study of risk perception by Gregory & Lichfenstein (1994) explored
some quantitative and qualitQtive risk factors associated with public concerns
about policy changes. The purpose of this studywas to measure the willing-
ness of subjects to make tradeoffs between quantitative risk factors such as53
dollar amounts, and numbers of injuries or deaths and certain qualitative
risk factors. To conduct the study, four versions each were written for two
problem stories. One version was given to each of 373 volunteer subjects
from the Eugene, Oregon area. The stories were varied by changing the
factors for two response modes and the presence or absence of some
qualitative risk information. In all versions the respondents were invited to
make written comments to clarify their answers.
The topic of the first set of four problem stories was a new lype of
bicycle brake that are supposed to work better in rainy weather. For the two
quantitative versions of this story, there was a tradeoff between a higher cost
for the new lype of brakes and a reduction of personal injuries. The added
cost for the brakes in the "injuries" version was $50, and the subjects were
asked what the reduction of injuries must be for their acceptance of the
added cost. The "dollars" response version reframed the tradeoff to a 50%
reduction in injuries. For this version the subjects were asked the highest
extra cost they would pay for this reduction of injuries. The reduction of
injuries was described as either a general reduction of 50% or half the
chance for an individual to crash.
For the two qualitative-risk versions of the Bicycle Brakes story, more
information was given to the subjects in addition to the same basic story.
These subjects were told that a new material was used for the better brakes
which was not completely understood by scientists. These Iwo groups were54
also told that some of the new material is released info the atmosphereas
the brakes are used, and that there is disagreementamong scientists whether
it could be harmful.It was alleged that a large majority of scientists believe
the material is completely harmless, and the small number who do suspecta
problem, are not able to predict definite details about the harm it might
cause.It was also reported that the scientists with concerns about negative
impacts in the future believed that any possible bad effects would not
become health hazards for several generations.
For the second problem story, the topic is Plastic Car Bodies. In the
two quantitative versions of this story, the subjects were fold that a new kind
of plastic could be used to make better auto bodies, which wouldsave lives.
The extra information for the two qualitative-risk versions added that little is
known by scientists about the new plastic. The subjectswere told that most
scientists believe it is completely safe, but a few speculate that junkedcars
will begin to disintegrate in about 100 years, which might release small
amounts of toxic chemicals into the groundwater.
For both response modes, and in each story version, the subjectswere
asked to respond as policymakers. The "Lives" version asked for the number
of lives saved per year which the subjects would need toapprove the use of
the new plastic. For the "Dollars" version the subjectswere to'd that the new
plastic would reduce the cost of cars. They were then asked theaverage
dollars per car needed for them to approve the use of thenew plastic. The55
questions for this problem area were framed to infer the tradeoffs between
quantitative and qualitative risk factors, but not specific tradeoffs between
dollars and lives.
For the Bicycle Brakes problem, a 50% reduction of injuries was the
median response from the 45 subjects given the no perceived risk, quantita-
five information. The median demand for reduction of injuries increased to
75% for the 41 subjects who received the additional qualitative perceived risk
information in the injuries version. For the "Dollars" response mode, $20
was the median willingness to pay for the 45 subjects in the no perceived risk
group. The willingness to pay median decreased to $5 for the 44 subjects
who received the additional qualitative perceived risk information.
For the "Dollars" response mode of the Bicycle Brakes problem, 50%
of the subjects in the perceived risk group refused to make the proposed
tradeoff and 10% from the no perceived risk group rejected the tradeoff. In
the perceived risk group of the "Injuries" mode, a small number of subjects
made extreme written responses which were considered by the researchers to
be refusals of the tradeoff. A greater number of the subjects from the groups
which received the qualitative perceived risk information made written
comments, than the subjects from the other two groups. The common theme
of these comments was that the status quo was better than a change with
possible bad side effects.56
From no perceived risk group, with the "Lives"response mode, 58%
of the subjects accepted the Plastic Car fora tradeoff of less than 1,000 lives
saved. The same tradeoff was accepted by only 18% of the subjects who
received the additional qualitative perceived risk information. The median
required number of saved lives was 100 for theno risk group and for the
perceived risk group, the median numberwas 20,000. For the "Dollars"
response mode, 23% of the subjects in the no perceived risk group required
$1,000 savings per car or less, as a tradeoff for accepting the Plastic Car,
4% of the subjects from the perceived risk group accepted thissame tradeoff.
The median required cost savings was $2,000 for theno risk group and
$5,000 for the perceived risk group.
The data for the Plastic Car problem were more difficult for the
researchers to interpret than for the Bicycle Brakes problem. Some subjects
from all four groups of this problem area made comments whichwere
obvious protests or refusals of the proposed tradeoffs. Therewas also some
difficulty in determining whether otherresponses were realistic tradeoffs or
complete rejections of the ideas presented in the problem. Environmental
anguish was clearly apparent in some subjects from all versions of both
problem areas. However, when qualitative descriptions of possible harmful
side effects of the proposed new technologieswere presented as concerns for
some scientists, many subjects refused to consider any tradeoff for the
perceived risk.lilA
The implications of this study are that most subjects will pay a price in
money or as a tradeoff of quantitative risks in order to avoid certain qualita-
tively perceived risks.It was found that the inclusion of these psychometric
risk factors altered the acceptable tradeoffs for some of the subjects, and for
others it completely changed the way they thought about the new technology.
The study revealed certain concerns that the researchers had not expected,
such as distrust for people who are charged with managing the risks which
can have serious harmful effects on the environment. In fad in some more
extreme responses, the subjects expressed a general disgust for science and
new technology, even when there was only a hint of some potential risks.
In a study by Gregory et al. (1995), the willingness to pay for environ-
mental amenities was explored. The monetary value that society places on
such things as hiking, sport fishing, or habitat preservation is known as the
contingent value (CV). While these environmental goods are not for sale in
the normal sense, they have a certain value to most people. This study was
based on the idea that while some people have strong feelings and place
high a value on environmental amenities, they are not able to precisely
represent the value in dollar amounts. The researchers were also concerned
about the context sensitivity of these CV responses.
The participants for this study were 425 people from the Eugene,
Oregon area. The majority were students of the University of Oregon, and
of the subjects had answered an advertisement in the University of Oregonnewspaper. These subjects were paid $8.00 to complete a six-page ques-
tionnaire during a 90 minute session. The instrumentwas developed in
several focus group discussions involving 32 participants. The questionnaire
contained a list of 12 proposed environmental projects, 5 computational
items and the instructions. The 12 proposed projects describeda context
such as a local area or issue which was familiar to most people, andsome
possible good which the prolect might cause. The subjectswere asked how
much they would be willing to pay each year for each proposed project.
The researchers were not alfempting to determine the actual dollar
amounts, but were exploring for differences in the expressed values from five
experimental conditions. The critical elementswere the understanding a
subject had of each project, and whether the proposedrange of budgetary
units was appropriate. A survey was previously made of 32 subjects to
determine whether these elements were understood. Toensure that the 12
items on project list were understood, some changeswere made. Two focus
groups had some in-depth discussions and then a second survey was made
of 200 subjects. The second survey also evaluated the computational
abilities of the respondents.
For each of the five versions of the final test,a different magnitude of
the budgetary unit was used. These unitswere said to equal $1, $2, $5,
$10, and $20, the subjects were told that state legislators used the unitsto
plan how yearly expenditures would be dividedamong competing projects.59
It had been determined by the pre-testing that the budgetary units made
sense in the context of the proposed projects. The design of the question-
noire gave four possible answers for each of the five versions of the 12
proposed environmental improvements. The sub jeds could refuse to pay
any amount, pay less than the unit, pay morethan the unit, or they could
agree to pay an amount equal to the unit.If the option of more or less was
selected, then a factor to multiply or divide the budgetary unit was requested.
Based on the five computational questions, about one third of the 425
subjects were dropped from the sample. This reduced the number to a total
of 277 for the final sample. The criterion for rejecting a subject was failure
on at least one of the questions in the computational partof the question
naire. The stated purpose for this study was not to elicit an actual willingness-
to-pay value, but to test for differences of expressed values in the context of
different magnitudes of a budgetary unit. The results were not to be used for
generalization of dollar amounts or to represent the general population.
For the purpose of comparison, the budgetary unit values of all
responses were converted to a dollar amount for each condition. The
median willingness-to-pay for each of the five conditions in all 12 proposed
projects was used for analysis of the data. The mean response values were
not used because the distributions were skewed. One of the 12 projects was
discarded because 57% of the subjects refused to pay anything for it.In
three of the remaining 11 projects, the median responses were identical tothe budgetary units assigned to each version. A total of six projects had
responses which increased with the magnitude of the budgetary units. Two
items did not show a substantial variation across the payment methods. The
remaining three items all showed a steady increase across the first four
budgetary units, but on the last unit they collapsed.
A systematic change in the response values was observed, together
with a strong preference for the budgetary unit suggested in each version of
the 11 projects. The original hypothesis was that people have no readily
accessible cash value for environmental amenities. Gregory ef al. (1995),
have refined their thinking as a result of this study. The data suggest that
people do in fact have a concept of the value within a broad range. An
assumption is made that these concepts are not precise, and therefore, a
response equal to the suggested budgetary unit was common when it was
within the broad range conceptualized by the respondents.
It was concluded that any suggested amount that falls within a broad
range is acceptable to an individual if it represents the concept that environ-
mental quality has some degree of importance. Within this range, the
context of each situation appears to have a strong influence on the maximum
willingness-to-pay which may be elicited from respondents.It appears that
when people have only a vague concept of the monetary value of some non-
market good, they will accept an arbitrary cash value if they lack precise
knowledge or experience in the situation. These imprecise estimates of valuewere constructed by the individuals during the decision process. It is recom-
mended by Gregory et al. (1995), that value-structuring strategies and
techniques be used in resource policy decisions.
Satterfield and Gregory (1996) provide further insight in the quest for
a link between public policies and environmental values. They argue that
situational details are often missed by standard survey techniques. To gain a
perspective of the environmental values held by the public, decision makers
need to consider many dimensions. The search for this information must be
personally meaningful; additionally it must be pragmatic and theoretically
defensible. They maintain that the cognitive reasoning that connects values
with actions can be traced through other methods and analytical procedures.
Their contention is that when the expressed values of individuals fail to
correspond with their related actions in the decision context, it is crucial to
define what reasoning takes place between the Iwo points.
A paper by Satterfield and Gregory (1996) described an experimental
questionnaire designed to mimic decision-pathways.It was used as part of a
large survey study done in the province of Ontario, Canada in 1994. The
primary study consisted of several surveys related to forest management, and
was conducted for the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. Samples were
taken from Iwo different populations in the Ontario area. The largest
sample (n= 1500) was randomly selected from the general population, and
consisted of mostly urban dwellers. The other sample was randomly selected62
from timber dependant rural communities, and was divided into two groups.
The first group (n=642), were residents who were not employed by the
timber industry, and the second group (n=159), all lived in households with
at least one person employed in the timber industry.
A subset of the respondents were then asked to respond to a decision-
pathways survey. For this experimental survey the sample size from the
general population was (n=301), from the non-timber employed rural
residents (n= 167), and from the timber employed rural residents (n= 167).
A broad set of values related to common beliefs about natural systems, the
environment and the role people should play in nature was the essence of
the study. Based on these ideas, some focus-group discussions, other
previous research and the findings of some pilot studies, 25 questions were
written. No reference was made to a validation process in the research
report.
The 25 questions were linked in various combinations to form a total
of 13 potential decision-pathways. Many respondents selected certain
pathways and others pathways were chosen by only a few people. Certain
paths were quite similar and there were wide differences in others. Some of
the original 13 pathways were combined with others that were similar and
some were eliminated to create a final representative set of five distinct
pathways. The first split of pathways was based on a question of value
judgement regarding the desirabilily of controlling nature or not. All of therespondents were asked this question that divided people who supported
forest management in general from those opposed to it.
Based on the general principle of forest management there were two
paths with subsequent resistance to any practice of controlling unwanted
vegetation in replanted forest lands. For one of these, path 1 (n= 19), there
was a general distrust of technology and forest managers. For path 2
(n=53), the reason was that nature is so complex that it is better at self-
management. A total of 41.6% of timber workers selected paths 1 and 2,
compared with 24.5% of urban dwellers and 27.2% of non-timber employed
rural residents.
For the three paths with no objection to some vegetation control, there
were smaller differences between the responses. Path 3 (N =42), supported
aerial spraying. Paths 4 and 5 were opposed to aerial spraying of herbi-
cides, but path 4 (N =102), was in favor of directly applied herbicides. Path
5 (N=65), favored controlling vegetation in more natural ways such as
managed fire, cover crops, grazing or natural toxins. Human health was the
underlying reason for the resistance of spraying in paths 4 and 5. Paths 4
and 5 included information about the possible invasion of harmful non-
native weeds which could have adverse effects on the forest, but despite this
possible threat the respondents were not supportive if the aerial spraying.
The conclusions reached for this decision pathways experiment were
that a large percentage of people will make tradeoffs when they understand64
the complexities of real life moral decisions. Significant numbers of respon-
dents were willing to compromise their strongly held environmental ideals for
practical reasons. A common theme of the concerns regarding management
practices, was lack of confidence in technology and forest managers. An
important aspect of this new survey approach is the departure from a
description of values in sharp declarative statements. The researchers found
that instead of dealing with controversial uniform value declarations,ifwas
better to examine the values deeply embedded in the data.
The analysis of the decision-pathways revealed very complex opinions
held by the respondents.It was found that expressions of environmental
values are not always followed by strong support for related management
actions. While most people were found to care deeply about the environ-
ment, they did not always agree about the level of management intervention
that was appropriate. Often the individual perceptions were not complete in
regard to the natural systems or the proposed interventions by managers. It
was found that people will sometimes change their opinions when more
complete information is clearly communicated to them. The most important
point of this study is that it is possible to find quantitative and qualitative
methods to explore the cognitive processes that occur between the expression
of strongly held ideals and the final ads of support or resistance for related
interventions.65
Studies of Social Issues and Scientific Thinking
Zeidler (1 984a) conducted a study to examine the mediating effects of
science content knowledge, moral reasoning abilily, attitudes, and past
experiences on the formation of judgements in regard to social environmen-
tal dilemmas. The subjects in the study were two groups of college age
students. One group was comprised of third and fourth year environmental
science majors. Their mean age was 21.7 years, with 23 females and 63
males. The students in the other group were first through fourth year non-
science majors, with fewer than 12 credit hours of science. This group
contained 66 females and 39 males, with a mean age for the group 0+19.3
years.
The three main objectives of the Zeidler study were: first, "to deter-
mine if environmental science majors exhibited higher levels of moral
reasoning on nontechnical social issues than on general social issues and if
they also reason at higher moral levels on environmental problems than
nonscience majors." Second, "to examine the extent to which possible
mediating factors (environmental attitudes, knowledge and personal experi-
ence) account for the difference in moral reasoning." Third, "to examine
how, in addition to what extent, such factors are revealed as people form
moral judgements" (Zeidler & Schafer, 1984.p. 2).
The study was conducted in two phases. Phase one was a battery of
four standardized tests used to measure each subject's level of moral reason-ing within environmental and social contexts, and in relationto his/her
knowledge, interest and experience. The Defining Issues Test(DIT) measured
moral reasoning on general social problems. The design of theDIT con-
sisted of stories about social dilemmas, and eachwas accompanied by
statements reflecting different levels of moral judgement. The sub jedswere
asked to rank these statements according to their perceived importance.The
criterion group validity of the DIT is 50%. The test has significant longitudinal
change validity (p=<O.0001). Test-retest reliability is 0.80, and the internal
consistency is in the upper 0.70s (Zeidler & Schafer, 1984,p. 3).
The Environmental Issues Test (Eli)was used to measure moral
reasoning on specific environmental issues that do not requireany special-
ized technical knowledge. The Eli has significant criteriongroup validity
(p<O.001) across various ages. The Eli has 0.73 convergent validity with
the Dli, and the test-retest reliability is 0.79 (p<O.001). The Test ofEcology
Comprehension (TEC) was used to measure interrelated environmental
concepts.It has a test-retest reliability of 0.67 (Zeidler & Schafer, 1984,
p.3).
The Ecology Altitudes Inventory (EAI)was used to measure the verbal
commitment, actual commitment and affect of each subject for the environ-
ment. The significance of criterion group validity for the EAIon various sub-
scales ranges between p<O.Ol and p<O.O5. Thetest-retest reliability is 0.92
for the composite of all subscales(p<O.00l). The composite of the Eli, TEC67
andEAIscores for each subject was used as his/her environmental attitude
score (Zeidler & Schafer, 1984, P. 3).
The four instruments for phaseone were administered in Iwo sessions
one week apart. The order of the tests was randomly assigned to the sub-
jects. Half from each group were given the EIT first and half from each
group were given the Dli first.In the second session the two testswere
switched so that all subjects responded to the EIT and the DIT inone of the
Iwo sessions. The EAI was given to all sub jeds in the first test session and the
TEC was given to all subjects in the second test session.
A 2 X 2 ANOVAwas done to find group differences in moral reason-
ing on social and environmental dilemmas.Amultiple regression analysis
was performed to find the mediating effect of each subject's Dli, TEC and
EAI scores on his/her Eli score. The datawere factor analyzed to generate a
standardized factor score for each subject. Froma scattergram of each
subject's performance on the altitude and moral reasoning factors,11 pairs
of subjects were selected for phase Iwo of the study. Thepairs were chosen
for similar attitudes toward the environment, but different levelsof moral
reasoning.
Phase Iwo was designed to gather qualitative data from thereasoning
of each pair of subjects as they engaged in conversations whileforming
moral judgements. The subjectswere asked to decide which of their original
responses to the Eli was most appropriate as a final response to the Elirepresenting the combined opinions of both members of the pair. The
sub jeds were allowed to have their original responses on hand while work-
ing as pairs. Each pair was asked to discuss their individual responses
before reaching a consensus for their final response. The conversations of
the 11 pairs were tape recorded and transcribed.
Phase one results showed no significant differences between the two
groups on the DIT scores, however there were significant differences between
groups on the EIT scores. The environmental science majors scored higher
than the nonscience majors on the EIT.
Significant differences were found for both groups between the Dli
and the Eli scores, with the environmental science majors and the non-
science majors scoring higher on the EIT than the Dli. There was no differ-
ence between groups on affed. However, there were significant differences
between groups on Environmental Attitude, Verbal Commitment, Adual
Commitment, and Ecology Comprehension. The environmental science
group mean was higher that the nonscience group mean for these four
variables.
Within group differences were also found for another variable identi-
fied as "decision commitment." More decisive decisions were made by both
groups on environmental issues (Eli) than on general social issues (Dli).
This was determined by the number of times each sub jed answered "yes" to
a course of action for solving a dilemma instead of "no" or "can't decide."The verbal commitment and actual commitment variables hadno predictive
validity for EIT scores, but affect toward the environment, science orientation,
ecology comprehension, and performance on the Dli were positively
correlated with performance on the Eli.
Phase two of the study revealed that the person with the higher
reasoning ability was generally able to influence the opinion of the other
person in the pair. When a consensus was reached in the discussions by the
pairs, the final combined Eli score was most often higher than the mean of
the combined high and low scores from theIwomembers of each pair. In
20 of the 26 cases where the pair members originally disagreedon a course
of action to solve one of the five dilemmas, their final consensuswas in favor
of the person with the higher reasoning ability. Zeidler & Schafer (1984)
believe that this indicates a persuasion factor is associated with higher stage
arguments.
Four reasoning trends were identified from the phase Iwo data by
analyzing portions of the conversations between the subjects. By doing this
the subject's interpretations of the environmental-moral dilemmaswere
revealed. The four trends were based on transcripts from the tapedconver-
sat ions of 10 pairs of subjects. Normative Reasoning is when frequent
referrals are made to personal experience thaf is seen by the subjectas
normal, and in agreement with social norms or personal subjective values.
Casuistical Reasoning is when hypothetical considerationsare subtly altered70
and construed by the person as facts and result in a false type of reasoning.
These two trends were unique in the mediating effect they had, because of
the influence of education and social experience.
Resolving Means and Ends is described as a pattern where some
subjects looked at the broad consequences of an issue, and then tried to
determine whether the proposed solution was justified by the expected result.
Stage Response Differentiation was manifest by the way statements from the
EIT were construed by the subjects. The variation in responses was thought
to reflect the underlying developmental stage of moral reasoning for each
subject. Zeidler & Schafer (1984) stated that these two trends confirm
developmental stage theory as advocated by Piaget (1948) and Kohlberg
(1973, 1976, 1978).
This study suggests that the level of reasoning used by the subjects
was situationally determined, It was concluded by Zeidler & Schafer (1984)
that both science and nonscience majors exhibited higher levels of reasoning
on environmental issues than on general social issues. They suggest that this
was influenced by the higher affect of both groups toward the environment
than toward general social issues. However, it was not clear whether this
was because of a genuine understanding of the issues or because of contem-
porary social norms.It was also suggested that each individual is able to
reason at a range of levels on a quantitative continuum that is determined by
the context of the problem.7l
It was proposed by Zeidler & Schafer (1984) thatreasoning is not a
value-free intellectualizing task, and that the attitudeand personal beliefsa
person has about the content of a problem might influence his/her reasoning
about the problem. They also assumed that EcologyComprehension is a
major contributing factor in the resolution of environmentaldilemmas, even
though DIT, Affect, Group Membership, andEnvironmental Attitude out-
wardly appeared to be better predictors of environmentallyrelated moral
issues. The rationale for this is that Ecology Comprehensionhad the second
highest correlation of all variables with the Eli, andhad higher correlation
with the Dli than the remaining variables.
An unanticipated trend was identified in the transcriptsof the conver-
sations between the 10 pairs of subjeds. Thispattern was termed "norma-
tive reasoning" and relates to the internalized socialexperiences of the
subjects. These social experienceswere believed to influence their personal
values and their individual objective views of reality.The subjeds sometimes
defined their own values as socialnorms that were rooted in strong emo-
tions. In six of the 10 pairs, the moral reasoning ofthe subjects was shaped
or mediated by their normative experiences.
Zeidler & Schafer (1984) also referredto another trend that was
identified in phaseIwoof the study. This pattern relatesto the perceptions
the subjects had of the moral dilemmason the EIT, and was termed "casuis-
tical reasoning". During the discussions, of the10 pairs some of the subjects72
with both high and low reasoning ability hada tendency to construe the
hypothetical aspects of the problem materialas matters of fact.It was
argued that subjects who exhibited this patternwere using a type of false
reasoning to resolve the moral dilemmas. One conclusion of this studywas
that the subjects revealed both inhibiting and facilitating reasoningpatterns
in their argumentative encounters.
Kuhn et al. (1988) provided more insight on the nature of scientific
reasoning. They conducted five studies to determine how students made
choices about everyday matters. The studieswere designed to investigate the
thinking skills used to make everyday decisions, and the intentwas to identify
generalized patterns of cognition. A key concept usedas a basis for the
studies was that in order to coordinatea theory with evidence, a person must
view them as separate from one another.It was also asserted that this
coordination requires a person to evaluate new evidence and other possible
theories. To achieve this requires a high level of metacognition, whichwas
defined as the ability to reflect on one'sown cognition.
Kuhn et al. (1988) argued that people represent the reality of the
world with causal theories thatare a result of their own personal interpreta-
tions of fundamental cues about how the world works. They believe thatthis
can have a powerful influence on the way individual cognition is organized.
It is maintained that these causal theoriesare repeatedly revised as an73
individual gains more experience in the world. The results of this on going
process can be both naive and sophisticated causal theories.
The methodology used in this series of studies was distinctive in two
ways. The intent was to depart from a domain specific view of cognition and
also from any concern with the origin of the cognitive skills being examined.
Another point stressed by the researchers was a basic assumption that
scientific reasoning is influenced by the exclusion as well as the inclusion of
evidence, inclusion was defined as an inference that a body of evidence is
an indication of a causal relationship between a potential antecedent van-
able and an outcome variable. Exclusion was defined as an inference that
the evidence indicated no relationship between an antecedent variable and
an outcome variable.
For study 1 a there were 65 subjects equally represented by sex. There
were 20 from a mixed fifth- and sixth-grade classroom in an urban school
system. This group had a median age of 11 years, 8 months and was
referred to as the sixth-grade group. Another group of 20 sub jeds came
from a ninth-grade classroom in the same school system and their median
age was 14 years, 7 months. A third group of 20 adult subjects was selected
through personal contacts with the interviewers for the study. Their median
age was 29 years and most of them were employed in sales or office occu-
potions. They were all high school graduates and 4 had attended two years
or less of college. A separate group of 5 adult subjects was included and74
referred to as the philosophers. All 5 subjects were advanced-level Ph.D.
candidates from the department of philosophy at Columbia Universily.
The problem material for the first study pertained to the way that
children's diets affect their susceptibility to colds. During the initial session
the sub jeds were told that some scientists had done a study at a boarding
school where everyone ate the same food at each meal. The school was
asked to serve certain food at each table for six months and the school nurse
was asked to keep records of any colds the children had during that time.
Evidence was then presented sequentially and cumulatively to each
subject in the main interview session. After each of eight presentations of
evidence an evaluation was elicited from each subject and information was
given about a binary outcome and the status of four variables. Two of the
four binary variables were covaried perfectly with outcome and the other Iwo
variables had no covariation with outcome over the eight instances. The
covariation evidence was used to test for an inference by inclusion of evi-
dence to support a causal theory. The noncovariation evidence was used to
test for an inference by exclusion of evidence against a causal theory.
For each subject the two variables with covariation evidence that were
used by the interviewer in the second session were chosen because of the
individual's responses in the first session. One of the variables was related
to a causal theory and one was related to a noncasual theory revealed by
each subject in the first session. The two noncovariation variables were75
selected on the same basis as the covariation variables. This provided Iwo
variables for which each subject held a causal theory andIwovariables for
which each subject held a noncausal theory. For the two causal theories,
one was presented with covariat ion evidence, and one was presented with
noncovariation evidence. Likewise, one noncausal theory was presented with
covariation evidence, and one noncausal theory was presented with non-
covariation evidence.
This design made it possible to examine the same theories with
different evidence, and different theories with the same evidence for each
subject in the study. The procedure for the first session was to present each
subject with a sequence of 35 types of foods portrayed on flash cards, with a
label and three possible choices for the subject to select as a response. The
three verbal options were:1) "Very sure the food makes a difference"; 2)
"Don't know whether or not the food makes a difference"; 3) "Very sure the
food makes a difference." In the second session approximately 1 week later,
the interviewer repeated the same introduction as in the first session, but then
added more information.
The additional information for the second session was that the nurse
had reported that some tables of children had gotten lots of colds and that
others had gotten very few colds, with none of the cases falling in between.
These outcomes were shown in squares on a large piece of cardboard in
picture form. One of the four levels of the variables was shown in each76
corner of the squares. As each set of information was presented to the
subject, the interviewer would summarize it verbally and then ask for a
response. After each response the interviewer would probe for an explana-
tion of how the subject had arrived at his/her answer.It was the intention of
the interviewers to present the questions in a way that would allow each
subject to refer to evidence in his/her own individual style.
After study la was completed, the same procedure was repeated in
study 1 b. For this study there were only 15 fifth/sixth graders and 15 ninth
graders used in the sample. These subjects were from the same population
and had similar sex distribution, age ranges and medians as the same two
groups in study10.The adult groups were not used in study 1 b. For study
1 b there was a minor change in the instructions given to the subjects by the
interviewers. In the second session the subject was reminded before each
response to answer the question on the basis of the scientist's findings, and
not based on his/her own personal knowledge about foods.
There was a very slight improvement in performance for study 1 b by
the sixth graders, but not by the ninth graders. A combinedIwoway analysis
of variance was done for age by condition for the la and 1 b groups of sixth
graders and ninth graders. A significant effect was not found for age or
condition on the covariation or the noncovariation evidence. All of the
results from study 1 a and 1 b were comparable for evidence-based responses
whether spontaneous or elicited. Any responses with no reference to evi-77
dence were labeled theory-based responses, andacross all age groups 21%
of the first responses were evidence based, but the percentagerose to 66%
for the latter responses.
For all age groups the spontaneous evidence-based responses
increased as more evidence was given. This was found for both the covaria-
tion and the non-covariation evidence and as the age of the groups in-
creased, the frequency of the evidence-base responses also increased. There
was more variability in the younger sub jeds, and some gave no evidence-
based responses. The philosophers shifted to the evidence-basedresponses
sooner than the other adults, but each adult made some evidence-based
responses. There was no significant difference in performance by gender.
The cause of the variation in the performance of the younger subjectswas
not clear, but it was suggested that differences in verbal ability might have
had some effect.
For study 2 of the series there were 100 subjects in fivegroups of 20,
and equally represented by gender. Three of the groupswere from third,
sixth and ninth grade classes in an urban school system. The fourthgroup
was comprised of adults mostly in their 20's who were enrolled in a commer-
cial business school. Four of the adults had attendedsome community
college classes and all except two of the group were high school graduates.
The fifth group were all graduate students in educaton. This studywas
focused on two main issues; first, was whether the subjectswere able torz
make prediction judgements based on implicit evaluationofevidence. The
second issue was to find how knowledge and beliefs related to setsof
evidence and theory.
Study 2 was designed to examine two parallel sets of problems. One
set of problems were foods problems similar to those in the 1 a and 1 b
studies, except that the versions were abbreviated. The second set of prob-
lems was selected to minimize the possibilily that the subiects had any prior
beliefs or knowledge of the issues.
The topics selected were a stains problem and a plant problem. One
change in the design was that only five evidence instances were presented to
each subjed with only Iwo of the four variables for each instance. The
procedure for the presentation of each problem instance and the questions
about the variables were similar to the procedure in the 1 a and 1 b studies.
The resultsofstudy 2 showed that there were more overall evidence-
based responses for the stains problem than for the plant problem. How-
ever, the new problem material did not eliminate the theory-based re-
sponses. The level of theory-based responding was most prevalent in the
youngest group and decreased as the group age increased. The subjects
were categorized by the type of response they gave most often. Those
subjects who gave the theory-based responses most often or equally split
with evidence-based responses were unable to correctly answer the predic-
tion questions at better than a chance level.The results from the studies 1 a, 1 b and 2 showed that most of the
subjects did not have highly developed metacognitive skills. They were all
able to recognize a difference between noncovariation and covariation
evidence, but most were unable to use the evidence for their responses.
Most responses were inferences of inclusion based covariation evidence.
About one fourth of all the subjects inferred a causal relationship on the
basis of one co-occurrence of antecedent and outcome. The subjects
believed with certainty that this was enough evidence to prove their causal
theories.
The noncovariation evidence was not correctly used by most of the
subjects to make inferences of exclusion. The researchers were unsure
whether this was because they ignored the evidence or could not interpret it
correctly. For whatever reason, these subjects were very prone to make
fallacious inferences. Another root of the fallacious inferences was a strong
tendency for these subjects to make false inclusions based on consistent
covariation evidence even in the presence of multiple covariates. This
occurred some of the time for all subjects except the philosophers.
Study 3 of this series was based on a new set of problem material.It
was designed to present a set of sports balls to the subjects to handle and
examine. There was a total of 16 balls with four different dimensions; size,
color, texture and ridges. These features were combined in different sets to
present as variables to the subjects. The subjects were told that a sportscompany was developing a new game, and wanted to find out which type of
ball was best for making serves. Initially they were asked about their theories
in regard to the best type of ball for serving.
Study 3 was designed to replicate the previous studies in this series,
but more concrete evidence was used to reduce the chance that subjects
would be confused about the outcomes as they were depicted by the inter-
viewers. Another difference was that each subject was only asked to decide
the least important variable and the most important variable. There was not
an effort to ask subjects about theories they were moderately certain about
as had been done in the previous studies. Because of this design, only two
variables were used for each subject. These were the Iwo that each subject
had selected as least important and most important.
The sub jeds were equally represented by sex and the groups of
children were from several urban parochial schools. There were 30 third
graders, 30 sixth graders, 30 ninth graders and a group of 30 adults age
18-26 years, that were recruited from a business training school. The
subjects were told by the interviewers that the new game was not completely
developed and that the rules were not yet decided. They were told that the
company had learned that some of the balls were good for serving and
some were bad for serving, but there were really not any balls in between.
The variables were described verbally before the subjects physically exam-
med them.EI
To assess the subject's casual theories the interviewer picked up one
ball at a time and asked each sub led to suppose that he/she had just tested
the ball by serving it over a net with a special paddle. The sub jeds were
asked which of the features made a difference in how serves could be made.
In addition, they were asked to give reasons why, for the features mentioned,
and if any feature was not mentioned by a subjed he/she was asked if it
made any difference. Each individual was then asked to rate the four
variables in order of most importance. Some subjeds said that no variables
made a difference and they were excluded from the study. All sub jeds who
were interviewed maintained that at least one variable did not make a
difference.
For the evidence evaluation phase the interviewer would hold one ball
at a time and ask the sub jed to make an evaluation. Only theIwovariables
he/she had seleded as most important and least important were to be
considered as evidence for the evaluation. As a determination was made by
the sub jed, the ball was placed in one of two baskets labeled either good
serve or bad serve. For this phase the questioning was identical to the form
used in the other studies previously done in this series. For half the subjeds
in each age group the evidence was covariation evidence and for the other
half it was noncovariation evidence.
The main focus of this study was to determine the stabilily of the
subject's theories and the presence of theory changes as a mode of resolvingdiscrepant evidence with their theories. The results showed that for all
groups except the third graders the stabilily the subject's theories was high.
The results showed that all of the subjects in Study 3 tended to reconcile their
theories with discrepant evidence by either ignoring it or by evaluating it in a
biased manner. The subjects in this study did not attempt to use new theo-
ries as a means to maintain theory and evidence alignment.
Study 4 of this series used the same set of sports balls as used in Study
3, but was focused on more complex reasoning skills. The sub jeds in Study
4 were 20 third graders, 20 sixth graders, 20 ninth graders, 20 noncollege
young adults, and 20 undergraduate college students. The firstIwophases
were identical to those in Study 3 and, additionally each subject was asked to
generate four sets of evidence. The subject was asked to consider the two
causal theories based on his/her most favored and least favored variables.
For each of these two variables, two sets of evidence was requested from
each subject. Two sets of evidence were to support the causal theories and
two sets of evidence were to refute them.
The subject was allowed to take a short rest and then given a brief
review of the four features of the sports balls. Two causal theories were then
presented on the basis of Iwo variable features of the sports boils. He/she
was told that the Iwo theories were supported by different experts from the
sports company and was also shown sketches depicting some tests with the
balls. The subject was then asked three questions in regard to the twotheories.1) Do these tests help show that one person's theory is right rather
than the other person's theory? Why? 2) Do the results of the tests prove the
theory is right? (If yes) How do they prove it?(If no) Why not? 3) What do
the test results say about the other person's theory? Do they say nothing, do
they prove it wrong, do they show that it is a little bit right?
Each subject in Study 4 was given 15 different problems in the form
described above. The evidence in each problem was tailored to each subject
based on that individual's responses during the theory assessment phase of
the interviews. The problems could fall into four categories:1) Insufficient
Evidence, 2) Equal Evidence, 3) Unequal Evidence, 4) Asymmetric Evidence.
Problems from all four categories were presented to every subject in a
constant order. A multiple set of evidence was presented for the final phase
of the procedure. The multiple evidence was presented for evaluation in
conjunction with only one theory in order to analyze the generation of
evidence by the subject.
The results of each interview were analyzed first to determine if a
response was theory-based or evidence-based. The frequencies of evidence-
based responses were comparable with the results of the prior studies in this
series. Each category of evidence was then considered in relation to the
responses.It was determined that in the groups below the ninth grade level,
the subjects were rarely able to recognize a lack of variation for a feature as
a reason not to make an inference of a causal relationship between a theoryand that feature. The college group of adults performed best for this lype of
evidence, but many of them were also unable to achieve this recognition of
insufficient evidence.
There were two basic forms of problems with mixed evidence. One
form portrayed a very modest covariation between variable and outcome,
and the other portrayed a stronger covariation. Many of the subjects had
great difficulty with the interpretation of the mixed evidence. More than half
of them used inclusion of evidence to prove a theory even when covariation
was not strong between an antecedentand an outcome. Group age was a
factor in the inclusion errors, with the older subjects making them more often
than the younger subjects. Some subjects made qualified inferences of
inclusion when covariation evidence was weak, but most subjects treated all
levels of covariation evidence as equal.
An important conclusion reached in Study 4 was that a biased evalua-
tion of the equal or the unequal evidence problems was most likely to occur
with covariation evidence than with noncovariation evidence. Also, there was
more bias found in making the inclusion inferencesthan the exclusion
inferences. These biases were more likely in the younger groups than the
older groups, with the ninth graders and the college adults showing the least
bias. The most bias of all was found in the interpretation of the insufficient
evidence problems.It was found that this type of error was the result of aninteraction between the individual theories and thevague or incomplete
evidence.
The asymmetric evidence problems were most strongly influenced by
the individual theories of the subjects. This theoretical bias increasedmost in
the group of college adults who had been able to perform with fewererrors
on the problems with the other three types of evidence.It was found that
within the groups there was a greater variation between individuals in the
third graders, the sixth graders, and the noncollege adults. Some subjects in
these groups showed a bias toward their own theories inevery problem or
every problem but one. Others in these three groups showed a bias toward
their own theories on only one of the 15 evidence evaluation problems.
A significant result of Study 4 was the distinctive performance by the
ninth graders and especially by the college adults. The researcherspostu-
lated that this finding is an indication that the experiential backgrounds of
the subjects affected their evaluation of the evidencemore than their age
differences. There was also a wide difference between thegroups for the
generation of evidence. The ninth graders and the college adults performed
better in this aspect than the younger groups and the noncollege adults. All
of the subjects were requested to generate covariation evidence and
noncovariation evidence in connection with the causal theories theywere
evaluating.All subjects performed better when generating covariation evidence to
defend a causal theory than when they were generating noncovariation to
disprove a causal theory. Over 90% of all the subjects were able to generate
some covariaf ion evidence, only the college adult group reached that level
for non-covariation evidence. For the other groups the percentage for the
noncovariation evidence was about 66%. Many sub jeds were unable to
confine their focus to only one variable at a time. Another major difficulty for
many of them was their inability to focus on a causal theory other than the
one they believed was true. This caused these subjects problems in generat-
ing any form of evidence for theories other than their own.
The focus of Study 5 was the skill used by the subjects for coordinating
theory and evidence. The subjects were 20 children from a mixed fifth- and
sixth-grade classroom in an urban school district. The subjects were divided
into two groups, a control group and an experimental group. Each of the 10
subjects in the experimental group was presented with the balls problems
once a week for 9 weeks. Each of the 10 subjects in the control group was
presented with the balls problems once in the first week and once in the ninth
week. The problems were identical to the evidence evaluation problems
used in Study 4.
Study 5 used a sample too small for the researchers to make broad
generalizations, but the results showed an improvement in the skill of the
subjects in the experimental group. These individuals were gradually able togenerate more noncovariation evidence and covariation evidence as the
study progressed. These subjects also made improvements in recognizing
insufficient evidence and also in coordinating theory and evidence. They
were able to progress to a skill level where they could coordinate the same
body of evidence with contrasting theories and avoid the biasing effects of
their own causal theories. None of the same progress in skill level was
observed in the control group.
Study 6 was designed to explore the effects of divergent evidence on
the subject's thinking by presenting them with two discrepant pieces of
evidence regarding one specific event. In Study 4 there were two conflicting
theories presented with only a single body of evidence. Both studies were
intended to examine a subject's ability to objectively evaluate evidence and a
theory as separate entities. For Study 6 the problem material was changed
to a war betweenIwofictitious countries. The event was called the Fifth
Livian War, and was recorded in writing by a historian from each country.
The Study 6 subjects were 20 sixth graders, 18 ninth graders, 20
twelfth graders, all from a large urban school district. There was also a
group of 19 graduate students in education at a large urban university, and
a group of 20 nonstudent adults recruited by an interviewer from the general
population. The nonstudent adults had more diverse and overall higher
education than the nonstudent adults in the previous studies of this series.
Two of them had a high school diploma, 8 had some college, 4 had collegedegrees, and 6 had done some graduate work. The total of the sub jeds in
the five groups was 97.
The two brief accounts of the Fifth Livian War were read to each
subject and the subject was invited to read along on printed copies of the two
different accounts. The subject was then asked to describe in his/herown
words what had happened. When finished the subject was asked two
questions.1) Are theIwoaccounts of the war different in any important
way? (If yes) How are they different? 2) Could both accounts be right? (If
yes) How can that be? Each subject's account was evaluated to find whether
or not a single account had been constructed. Then each statement made by
the subject was classified as either a simple statement, which was definedas
two descriptions of the event; or a metastatement, whichWQSdefined as one
statement about one or both of the accounts.
On the basis of the Iwo probe questions the responses of each subject
were classified at one of six response levels. Level 0 was used for responses
with no differentiation between the accounts of the war and thewar itself.
Level 1 was used for responses with a distinction between the two accounts
and the war, but without any mention that either or both of the accounts
could deviate from what actually happened. In Level 2 responsesa partial
discrepancy was acknowledged between the Iwo accounts, butno altempt
was made to reconcile this. The subjects who gave level 2 responses re-
garded the discrepancy as simply incomplete records of the facts.In the remaining three response levels, there was an awareness that
theoretical interpretation played a role in the construction of the two different
accounts, but different weights were assigned to this role at each level. At
Level 3 the role was seen as only the personal opinion of each writer. At
Level 4 the discrepancy was seen as reconcilable because the two writers had
superficial differences in their perspective of the same fads. At Level 5 the
different backgrounds in history, culture and the belief systems of theIwo
writer were considered to be the causes of the discrepancy. These differ-
ences were recognized by the subjects who gave Level 5 responses as major
problems for reconciliation of the two accounts.
Study 6 results showed that the subjects responding at Levels 0, 1 and
4 always gave a single account of the Fifth Livian War, and they only noted
minor differences in the two written accounts. The subjects responding at
Levels 2, 3 and 5 did not attempt to reconcile thetwoaccounts into a single
version. The percentage of metastatements rose from 0% at Level 0 to 45%
at Level 5. No gender differences were found. The data showed a trend for
level of response by age group. Sixth and ninth graders responded mostly at
Levels 0, 1, and 2. Most twelfth graders responded at Levels 2, 3, and 4.
Both adult groups responded mostly at Levels 3, 4 and 5.
In concluding this series of studies, "the present results may point to
the possibility that patterns of developmental change leading to adult modes
of thinking have the potential for providing insight into the nature of adult1i]
functioning as well as providing a framework for conceptualizing individual
variation among adults" (Kuhn et al. 1988, p. 234). A claim was made by
the researchers that an academic environment facilitates and supports the
kinds of thinking skills examined in the studies. The key elements needed for
developing these thinking skills are claimed to be recognition of the possibil-
ity of alternative causal theories, and recognition of the possibility of evi-
dence that does not fit a causal theory.
An important component of scientific thinking specified in these
studies was the ability to think about theories and how the evidence bears on
them, in contrast to merely thinking with the theories. This was believed to
be especially important in regard to any new evidence and the effect that it
had on the individual theoretical perspectives of the subjects.It was asserted
that the basic scientific thinking skills that were the focus of the studies are
not limited to any specific context, and may also be applied to everyday
decisions and in a wide variety of decision contexts.It was concluded from
these studies that scientific thinking skills are developed through experience
and may be improved with practice.
In another study, Kuhn (1991) investigated individual thinking skills by
analyzing the argumentation of the participants. In this study the subjects
were interviewed individually in Iwo sessions. The sessions were 45 to 90
minutes in length and took place from one to several days apart. These
interview sessions were recorded and transcribed for analysis. Locationsfamiliar to the subjects were selected for the interviews such as workplace,
school, or the subject's home.
The subject samples came from four age intervals: teens, age 14-15
years; 20s, age 20-29 years; 40s, age 40-49 years; and 60s age 60-69
years. Two variables, sex and education level, were used to separate each
age group into four categories of 10 subjects for a total of 40 subjeds in
each age group. The adult groups were divided into 10 college and 10
noncollege for each sex and age. For the teen group the education variable
was 10 noncollege bound and 10 college bound for each sex. In addition to
the 160 subjects in the main sample, a group of experts was selected to
participate in the study. These experts were five parole officers, five school
teachers, and five advanced candidates for PhD of Philosophy.
The philosophers were selected as general reasoning experts, while
the parole officers and school teachers were selected for the expertise in their
respective fields. Three social problems were selected as topics for the study.
The first interview was designed to elicit and probe the reasoning of each
subject on these social problems. The following questions were asked to
elicit a causal theory from the subjects for each problem topic.1) What
causes prisoners to return to crime after they're released? 2) What causes
children to fail in school? 3) What causes unemployment?
The topics were selected because they involve phenomena with true
causal structures that are complex and uncertain, yet there is a possibilily for92
a wide range of personal knowledge involved that the subjects may have
acquired. The individual knowledge of each subject was not measured
directly, but they were asked to give a self-report of their own personal
knowledge of each topic. After a subject had responded to the initial ques-
tions about each of the three social issues, the interviewer inquired how
he/she had come to hold this theoretical view. The subject was then asked to
give supporting evidence to justify each viewpoint or causal theory.
In the next segment of the interview each subject was asked for an
opinion on each issue that opposed his/her own three causal theories.
Sometimes an opposing theory was offered and sometimes a counterargu-
ment was given for the subject's own theory. When another theory was not
provided, the interviewer asked for one.If the subject was still unable to
provide an opposing theory, one was suggested by the interviewer and the
subject was asked to rebut it. The series of questions was ended by inquiring
about the subject's reflections on his/her own thinking, such as:1) How sure
are you? or, 2) Do experts know the cause? The subject was then asked
some questions about the importance of each issue to him/her personally
and to society.
In the second session the subjects were asked to evaluate evidence on
two of the three topics from the first interview. The two topics were crime and
school failure, and two types of evidence were presented for each topic.
First, was undetermined evidence that was in effect nonevidence. Second,93
over-determined evidence that was presented as three broad causes, each
advocated by a different authority figure. The three causes were presented
as operating in conjunction with each social outcome, but with an undeter-
mined effect on the outcome or on the other causes. After the subjects had
evaluated the evidence they were asked questions about their certainly and
the influence of the evidence on their own thinking.
The main purpose of this study was to identify the type of argument
presented by the subjects in regard to their own thinking. A rational argu-
ment was conceptualized by the researchers as not just what the subjects
thought, but why they thought what they did. This argumentative thinking
was considered to be an indication of an underlying set of beliefs that could
influence many decisions. When the reasoned views of a subject contained
opposing assertions with evidence supporting both, it was considered to be a
complete rhetorical argument. A distinction was made between a rhetorical
argument as in the above example, and a dialogic argument between two
individuals with opposing viewpoints. Both types of argument may be
considered reasoned arguments if the two opposing views are supported by
evidence.
The causal theories presented by the subjects were analyzed first by
content. This part of the theory analysis was considered to be of lesser
importance, but the classification of the content of each theory was subse-
quently used for the structural analysis of the theories. There were 19 causal94
lines identified for the crime topic, and 30 causal lines identified for the
school topic. There were differences found for these variables between the
genders and the age groups, but not the group educational level.In the
more important structural analysis, the form of argumentation used to
support a theory was partially defined by the number of different causal lines
included in the subject's theory.
The theories were classified as single cause, multiple cause with
parallel causal lines, or multiple cause with alternative causal lines. For the
crime topic the percentages of subjects that showed each causal theory type
were 49% single cause, 38% multiple parallel cause, and 12% multiple
alternative cause. For the topic of unemployment the percentages were 21%
single cause, 54% multiple parallel cause, 26% multiple alternative cause.
For school failure the percentages were 28% single cause, 46% multiple
parallel, and 27% multiple alternative cause.It was concluded that the
multiple cause theories were not necessarily more complex than the single
cause theories, but the multiple cause theories reflected a greater awareness
of the causal complexity of the social problems.
A major concern of this study was the supporting evidence used by the
subjects to defend their theories. All subjects did not produce genuine
evidence, and the evidence they did provide came in various forms. The
most common form was covariation evidence that was either:1) correspon-
dence, indicating some weak co-occurrence of antecedent and outcome; 2)95
explicit covariat ion, which indicated a comparison and quantification; or 3)
indicating a correlated change of antecedent and outcome. A second form
of the genuine evidence invoked an external factor to establish a link be-
tween antecedent and outcome. A third form was indirect evidence which
was either:1) an analogy, 2) an assumption, 3) discounting of an alterna-
tive, or 3) partial discounting of an alternative.
Less than half of the subjects produced any form of genuine evidence
in any of the responses to support theories. The most prevalent lype of
response included a scenario or script depicting how the social phenomenon
might have occurred. This was defined as pseudoevidence and it was
usually not sharply distinguished from the description of the causal sequence
in the sub jed's depiction of the theory. These scripts were either generalized
or specific in form, and at best were an elaboration of a causal sequence. A
few of the subjects gave nonevidence responses by:1) declaring the evi-
dence was unnecessary, 2) providing evidence not relevant to the topic, or 3)
restating the social phenomenon itself as evidence.
When a subject's response contained pseudoevidence it was deemed
to be a suggestion that a certain scenario of events was the way a sodal
phenomenon happened, with no regard for other possible explanations. The
subject was then prompted for an alternative explanation. Some subjects
attempted to provide an alternative causal theory distinct from their original
causal theory and the supporting evidence. These responses were consid-ered successful, partially successful, or unsuccessful. Some of the subjects
would not attempt to generate an alternative theory.It was found that the
ability to provide an alternative theory was consistent across topics for a
subject, or absent for all topics.
It was concluded that the subjects who produced alternative theories
were less likely to rely on pseudoevidence. The subjects who did rely on the
pseudoevidence seemed to perceive their own causal theories as a descrip-
tion of reality or the way things are.It was suggested that reasoning was
facilitated for the subjects when they had first-hand experience with a topic,
but that some subjects often showed competent reasoning without it. The
subjects were then asked how sure they were about their causal theories and
whether experts could know the for sure what the cause of a social problem
was. On the basis of their responses to these questions the subjects were
categorized as either absolutists, multiplists, or evaluative.
Subjects who fell into the absolutist category believed that an expert
either knows with certainty or can learn with sufficient study, the cause of a
social problem. The absolutists considered themselves as either less knowl-
edgeable, equally knowledgeable, or sometimes more knowledgeable than
an expert. The multiplists were more skeptical and denied the possibility of
expert certainty.In addition to doubting the experts, the multiplists claimed
that they could be as certain as anyone about the causes of social problems.
The subjects who were evaluative denied the possibility of certain knowledge97
just as the multiplists did. However, these evaluative people regarded
themselves as knowing less than the experts know about their specific topics.
A general conclusion of this study was that the forms of informal
reasoning used in everyday decision making varies widely among individu-
als. The study explored some basic skills used by ordinary people with
average intelligence to argue their points of view. The forms of thinking that
were identified were not domain specific, however the content was believed
to have some effect on the ways the subieds thought about the different
content domains. This was obvious in the small sample of domain specific
experts. Both the school teachers and the parole officers appeared to have
difficulty recognizing opposing points of view in their respective areas of
expertise.
While there was some effect of attitude shown in the reasoning of
most groups in the study the philosophers were an exception. In this group
the reasoning was consistently perfect for all subjects, in all segments of the
study. Likewise, there was consistency seen in form of the reasoning process
of some individuals across content domains. Kuhn (1991) believes this
indicates that the individual's reasoning process is independent of the
content area to which it is applied, and that it is possible for an individual to
become expert in the reasoning itself. She further contends that both the
valid and invalid informal reasoning examined in this study are relevant tothe thinking strategies of formal reasoning that are studied in a laboratory
setting.
The examination of the reasoned arguments in this study has both
societal and educational ramifications. Social behavior is connected to the
internal thought processes of each individual in a group. By conceptualizing
the argumentative reasoning structure of an individual it is possible to
identify underlying attitudes. This study did not focus on the interactive
dialogue of argument, but the methodology identified some cognitive aspects
of argument that are involved in the social process of argumentive discourse.
From an educational perspective the concepts examined in the study pro-
vided a pattern of skills that may be useful for evaluating the individual
development of informal reasoning competence.
Discussion
The combined studies in this review have provided the basis for the
current study. While each of them was unique in design and focus, there are
certain features of each that contributed to the framework for this research.
The most obvious of these is the exploration of decisions made by individuals
within a social context. Many early case studies were process oriented with
an emphasis on the social environment, yet some of those earlier researchers
recognized the importance of personal skills and the abilities of specific
individuals. Bolan & Nuttall (1975) argued that power and social influence
are important factors in community decision making, but they stressed thatthe personal attributes and special interests of the individuals who are
involved in any decision process must be considered. They used personal
interviews to gain a better understanding of the differences between the
individual decision makers.
Brunswik (1952) recognized that many variables outside of an individ-
ual may have an influence on the decisions he/she makes. In his lens model
for decision analysis he made allowances for both internal and external
factors to help understand the behavior of each individual. The theory of
Probabilistic Functionalism that was developed by Brunswik was the basis of
Social Judgement Theory that was advocated by Hammond (1955). While
these theories are both behavioristic in general, it was acknowledged by
Hammond (1966) that even the basic survival behavior of humans has a
more complex cognitive aspect that he defined as social judgement. This
was an important step toward the cognitive views of later researchers such as
Janis & Mann (1977) and Janis (1982), who recognized that when people
make decisions, they will use their information processing abilities to the best
of their obiliy. These researchers made some important contributions to a
line of research regarding social factors that influence group decision
making.
Janis & Mann (1977) developed Conflict Theory on the premise that
some people cog nitively restructure a decision context to accommodate
personal biases they may have. They argued that an individual will base'["SI
his/her cognitive restructuring on any ideology or value system that is in
agreement with these personal biases. A unique social concept that resulted
from this line of research is the notion of groupthink. Janis (1972, 1983)
described this as a situation where strong social pressure causes individuals
to conform with influential members of the group during a decision making
process. In a study of timber dependent rural communities, Salterfield &
Gregory (1996) found group differences in attitudes and beliefs about the
management of timber resources and the environment. Zeidler (1997)
stated that shared knowledge is socially constructed, and he suggested that
an appeal to popularily may contribute to fallacious reasoning.Janis (1983)
and Zeidler (1984a) found that the level of critical thinking and the quality of
group decisions increased when participants wereencouraged to debate with
one another and develop arguments to supportthose decisions.
Kuhn et at. (1988) found that the qualily of rhetorical arguments used
by people to support their viewpoints on various issues was affected by their
individual epistemology. They also found that individuals will often reflect on
their own personal experiences as supporting evidence when making deci-
sions or evaluating new ideas. This slyle of reasoning appears to be con-
nected with some of the fallacious reasoning patterns implicated by Zeidler et
at. (1992) and Zeidler (1997). Kuhn (1991) and Zeidler et al. (1992)
contend that the reasoning slyles of individuals are independent of the
content area, and that their reasoning patterns are acquired through educa-101
tion and other social processes. Safterfield & Gregory (1996) concluded that
when making complex real life decisions, most people will compromise their
environmental ideals for practical reasons. Both the societal and educational
implications of the other studies in this review give credence to the work of
Zeidler (1984a, 1985, 1992; Zeidler and Schafer 1984) on socio-scientific
reasoning.
Zeidler (1997) provided a list of analytical or inferential claims that he
contends are implicated in socio-scientific thinking. He affirmed that these
claims provide viable paths for additional investigation. Theseven claims
listed by (Zeidler, 1997,p. 493) are summarized as follows:
The tacit beliefs that students hold interact with the nature of the
problem at hand to affect students' initial conceptualization of
moral, ethical, or social problems.
Similar to scientific misconceptions, students findways to discredit
evidence that conflids with their initial core beliefs about moral,
ethical, or social problems.
The likelihood of reconciling personal beliefs with discrepant
evidence (anomalous data) decreases as the conviction to one's
beliefs increases.
Heuristic strategies that require less investment of cognitiveenergy
are generally favored over more formal strategies that are deduc-
tive or inductive in nature in evaluating mixed evidence.102
The degree of polarization (i.e. belief persistence) that may occur
is directly related to the strength of initial core beliefs.
Instruction across disciplines often fails to make to make clear
what evidence counts as legitimate support for various problems
and arguments. Additionally, a lack of functional understanding
of probabilities and statistical information contributes to made-
quate sampling practices.
Premise conversion is a subtle and dominant form of unwittingly
adding, deleting, or misrepresenting information central to a
problem that students are attempting to resolve.
Zeidler (1997) pointed out the importanceofan individual's core
beliefs on his/her pattern of argumentation and discourse. He stressed the
particular importance of these core beliefs when the individual is confronted
with an argument or opinion that is not congruent with his/her own. When
the positionofanother person is incompatible with an individual's prior
beliefs, he/she may respond by ignoring, rejecting, or excluding the conflict-
ing features of an opposing argument. Two other responses to the anoma-
bus features may be abeyance or reinterpretation rather than a complete
refusal to acknowledge them. In other instances the response could be a
peripheral shift in position with the core beliefs remaining the same, or
perhaps a total change of the individual's position and core beliefs.103
Zeidler (1 984a) studied the argumentation and discourse of students
by confronting them with a socio-scientific dilemma and then asking them to
critically analyze their reasoning as well as the reasoning of other students.
Often these arguments were constructed with a flawed form of reasoning or
the student had an erroneous conception of the problem issue. Zeidler et al.
(1992) contend that the most common forms of fallacious reasoning are
prevalent in student argumentation regardless of the content area. A
distinction was made between formal fallacies that superficially resemble
valid deductive arguments, and informal fallacies that deceive with ambigu-
ous language or an intentional design to cause acceptance of the argument.
Informal fallacies are encountered more often than formal fallacies in both
academic selfings and in everyday life.
Some informal reasoning fallacies commonly found in student argu-
mentation were described by Zeidler et al. (1992) as:1) Ad hominem
arguments that alfack a person's character or worth instead of his/her
argument. 2) Appeal to popularily, when a claim is made that most other
people accept a certain viewpoint. 3) False Dilemma, when an argument is
based on the assumption that there are only Iwo possible options rather than
many options. 4) Begging the question is an argument based on a different
form of the claim made in the original argument. 5) Hasly generalization,
based on a sample not randomly selected, not representative, or too small.
6) Appeal to authorily of a person who has expertise in one field, but not in104
the field for which the information or advice is being sought. The above six
examples are fallacies of relevance.
Zeidler et al. (1992) described five other reasoning fallacies as:1)
Fallacies of ambiguity, when an argument contains a word or term with
ambiguous meaning. 2) Fallacy of equivocation, when a word or term
appears in the context of on argument and has more than one meaning, but
is purported to have the same meaning. 3) Normative reasoning, when
social norms or experiences restrict the objectivity or comprehension a
person has about an issue. 4) Naive conceptions of argument structure,
when a person prefers to use an approach that requires minimal skill or
effort to argue an issue, such as a probabilistic conclusion or a heuristic
strategy. 5) Altering the representation of the argument by an inadvertent
modification or subtle change to one of the original premises of the argu-
ment.
Zeidler et al. (1992) and Zeidler (1997) stressed the great importance
of science literacy as an ideal and the definitive goal for educators to culti-
vate "scientific" habits of mind in their students. "Understanding the central
role of fallacious thinking is fundamental to the eventual success of realizing
this goal in science education" (Zeidler, 1997,p. 483). Zeidler provided a
framework to examine "samples of thought" related to the "social thinking"
of students in the context of scientific problems. A central component of this
framework is the analysis of discourse and argumentation. By examining105
thinking in this way the focus has changed from how an individual acts on a
problem to the cognitive structure of the individual in relation to a task
specific goal.106
CHAPTER III
DESIGN AND METHOD
Introduction
This study was focused on the decisions made by the leaders in two
Oregon cities with similar waste water treatment problems. Our educators
and philosophers have repeatedly stressed the importance of qualily thinking
and of knowing what people think. The search for a better understanding
has moved from learning not only what people think, but also why they think
as they do. The literature has indicated that the initial core beliefs held by
students can influence their solutions to socio-scientific problems in their
classrooms. The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of initial
core beliefs held by the leaders of the Iwo communities as they found solu-
lions for the socio-scientific problems in their respective communities.
To address the three primary questions in this study, the reasoning of
each individual who participated in the two group decisions was analyzed.
Other factors such as local political and economic interests were not within
the scope of this study. A questionnaire was employed to ascertain each
subject's initial core beliefs about wetlands and their use for waste water
purification. Linguistic information was collected by audiotaping interviews
with the subjects. In the interviews each subject was asked to explain his/her
decision to support or oppose the wetland waste water treatment alternative.
Transcripts of those interviews were then analyzed qualitatively to identify the107
reasoning patterns used by each subject to explain his/her action in the
group decision process.
It is appropriate at this point to disclose information regarding per-
sonal interests and experiences of the researcher. A lifetime of work and
recreation in the outdoors as well as many undergraduate courses in the life
sciences has cultivated an interest in ecology. An interest in local and global
environmental issues has been the logical connection to these interests and
experiences. Another relevant aspect of the researcher's personal back-
ground is prior involvement in the local political process. Three years as a
city councilor and an appointed member of numerous local boards and
committees has provided certain insight with regard to community decisions.
An interest in the individual reasoning of community members as they are
involved in the development of local environmental policies has been a result
of these factors. This background has clearly been a motivation for the
design of this study.It is recognized that these same factors may also be a
cause of some level of researcher bias.
Efforts were made while analyzing the data to minimize the effects of
any such bias. Numbers were used to identify the audiotape of each inter-
view and the questionnaire that was completed by each subject. No audio-
tape was transcribed for several months after the actual time that the inter-
views occurred, and the analysis of the responses to each interview question
was completed for all 24 of the subjects before moving on to the nextI:
question. The goal of this method was to accomplish an objective rating of
each response with a minimum of interference from the other responses by
the same subject. The lapse of time beiween the personal meeting with each
subject and the analysis of his/her responses was intended to help eliminate
some of the nonverbal information that might have had an effect on the
ratings given to the responses.
Research Questions
1. Can specific "critical thinking" operations (CTO) be identified in the
reasoning used by each subject to explain his/her decision regarding
a wetland waste water treatment policy?
2. Can any "fallacious thinking" patterns (FTP) be identified in the
reasoning used by each of the community leaders to explain his/her
decision regarding a wetland waste water treatment policy?
3. Can a pattern be identified between each subject's initial core beliefs
(ICB), and the reasoning he/she used to explain a decision regarding
a wetland waste water treatment policy?
Subjects
The units of analysis were elected city officials and some volunteer
citizens who participated in the two group decision processes. The elected109
officials were Cily Councilors from City A and City B who were in office at the
time each group decision was made. The elected officials from each city
worked closely with volunteer citizens in their respective decision processes.
Members of each volunteer group are included as subjects in the study. The
City B group consisted of seven elected officials and four volunteers. The
City A group included five elected officials and eight volunteers. The total
number of subjects in the study was 24.
The sample was derived from the recorded minutes that each city had
on file for the public records of each respective decision process. Letters of
informed consent were mailed to all of the people who were listed as mem-
bers of the decision making group for each city. Within a period of 15-30
days, these individuals were contacted by telephone and asked to participate
as subjects in the study. From the City A group, one individual was unwill-
ing to participate, and three were unavailable. From the City B group three
individuals were unwilling to participate, and four were unavailable.
For those who agreed to participate, an appointment was made to
meet with them for a short interview. Each subject was asked to suggest a
place to meet. From the City A group, ten subjects suggested their homes,
Iwosubjects suggested their offices, and one subject suggested a restaurant.
From the City B group, ten subjects suggested a conference room in the city
library, and one subject suggested his home. Each interview lasted between
30-60 minutes. At the beginning of each interview, the subject was asked to110
fill out a 20 question written questionnaire. When this was completed the
subject was asked to respond to seven open-ended interview questions. At
this time the subject was asked if it was okay to turn on the tape recorder.
There were no objections expressed by any subject who participated. After
the response was concluded for the final question, the recorder was turned
off, and the interview was ended.
Data Collection Methods
A paper and pencil questionnaire with a four point scale was filled out
by each subject at the beginning of his/her interview. The questionnaire
consisted of 20 questions about wetlands in the context of waste water
purification. Ten questions were each written to reflect a positive attribute of
the wetland waste water concept. Ten more questions were each written to
reflect a negative aspect of the same concept. The content validity of this
instrument was established by a panel of five experts.
The validation process was accomplished by giving each panel
member a copy of the questions that were proposed for the questionnaire.
Each of the 20 questions was defined in writing for the five panel members
regarding the intended purpose of the question. The panel members each
made written comments about any concerns he/she had about any of the
questions. The concerns were addressed by revising the questions, and the
process was repeated until there was an agreement on each question by four
of the five panel members on all 20 questions (see Appendix B).111
Audiotapes were then made of the reasoning used by the subjects to
explain their decisions regarding the new policies they developed for local
waste water management. In these face-to-face interviews the subjeds were
asked to respond to seven open ended questions. The main objedives of the
interview questions were: to encourage each subjed to discuss his/her
content knowledge, to obtain some insight about the basis of the content
knowledge, to have each subject state his/her position and present some
evidence to support the position, and to determine whether each subject was
aware of alternative positions and evidence that could be used to support
them.
Data Sources
The first objective of the study was to coiled data regarding each
subjed's initial core beliefs in the context of his/her role in the communily
decision process. The questionnaire was used to score the initial core beliefs
(ICB) of each subject regarding the use of a constructed wetland treatment
system to purify municipal waste water. The ICB scores were calculated by
using a four point scale to determine the strength of each subject's core
beliefs, and whether his/her belief index was positive or negative. This
method was advocated by Ajzen & Fishbein (1980).
The second objedive of the study was to coiled linguistic information
about the reasoning of each subject related to his/her involvement in the
community decision process. Each subject was be asked to discuss his/her112
reasoning in the context of the local group decision process. This method
was advocated by Kuhn etal. (1988) and Kuhn (1991).
Analysis of Data for Research Question One
The reasoning of each subject was examined for ten critical thinking
operations (CTO) conceptualized by Beyers (1988). Zeidler et al. (1992)
stated that the ten operations were derived, and synthesized from the litera-
ture of science, language arts, and social studies instruction. They are
presented from simple to complex as follows:
1)distinguishing between verifiable facts and value claims;
2)distinguishing relevant from irrelevant information, claims, or
reasons;
3) determining the factual accuracy of a statement;
4) determining the credibility of a source;
5)identifying ambiguous claims or arguments;
6)identifying unstated assumptions;
7)detecting bias;
8)identifying logical fallacies;
9)recognizing logical inconsistencies in a line of reasoning;
10) determining the strength of an argument or claim (p. 439).
The ten CTOs shown above are listed in hierarchical order, and
numbered from simple to complex. The corresponding numerical value was
used to represent each of them, advancing from 1 for the simplest to 10 for113
the most complex. The transcript of each interview was reviewed and rated
with the number of the most complex CTO that could be identified in parts A,
B and C. The three scores were totaled to obtain a cumulative score for the
responses that each subject gave. (See examples in Chapter IV.)
Analysis of Data for Research Question Two
The reasoning of each subject was examined for any of the 11
reasoning fallacies described by Zeidler et al. (1992). A subject's reasoning
was considered flawed if any of these 11 reasoning patterns were used to
explain his/her decision. The 11 fallacious reasoning patterns (FTP) are
identified as:
Pattern A: Ad hominem argument
Pattern B: Appeal to popularity
Pattern C: False Dilemma
Pattern D: Begging the question
Pattern E: Hasty generalization
Pattern F: Appeal to authority
Pattern G: Fallacies of ambiguity
Pattern H: Fallacy of equivocation
Pattern I:Normative reasoning
Pattern J: Naive conceptions of argument structure
Pattern K: Altering representation of argument114
Analysis of Data for Research Question Three
The highest levels of reasoning used by each subject were used to
determine a CTO value for research question one. The number of fallacious
thinking patterns used by each subject was used as the FTP value for re-
search question two. The numerical values for these Iwo variables, and the
ICB scores were then quantitatively analyzed to identify any possible patterns.
A regression analysis was performed in sets of Iwo for all three variables.
For the CTO and FTP variables there was a significant negative correlation
indicated. No significant correlation was indicated for any other combina-
tion of the three variables. Another pattern was suggested between the ICB
scores and the FTP variable. All findings of the study are discussed in
Chapters IV and V.115
CHAPTER IV
RESU LTS
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to examine the reasoning of the deci-
sion makers inIwocommunities, as they worked to solve local waste water
problems. The data were collected for this study in two parts and are
described both qualitatively and quantitatively. They were analyzed to
identify the critical thinking operations (CTO) employed by each subject
during the taped interviews, and to determine if the initial core beliefs (ICB)
of each subject can be linked to his/her reasoning or actions in the decision
process. The basic framework for collecting and analyzing the data is based
on the earlier work of other researchers discussed in Chapter II. Other
factors such as local political and economic interests were not within the
scope of this study.
Part one of the data was collected by asking each subject to fill out a
questionnaire that was designed to measure his/her core beliefs regarding
the use of constructed wetlands for purifying municipal waste water. An
index score for each subject's initial core beliefs about the wetland waste
water treatment alternative was calculated on a four point scale, modified
from the seven point rating scale advocated by Ajzen & Fishbein (1980). The
purpose of an index score of each subject's initial core beliefs is to compare
and contrast with the qualitative features of his/her reasoning (see Table 1).116
Table 1. Questionnaire scores.
City B ICB range was from 2-31 City A ICB range was from 18-39
31 39
30 33
27 31
26 30, 30, 30
25 26, 26
24 25
20 21
19 19
14 18,18
6
2
224 = total of City B ICB Scores 346 = Total of City A ICB Scores
The content validity of the instrument was established bya panel of
five experts from the field of science education. Dana Zeidler is from the
University of South Florida. Randy Bell is from the University of Virginia.
Norm Lederman, Barbara Crawford, and Larry Flick are from Oregon State
University. The validation process was accomplished by giving each panel
member a copy of the questions that were proposed for the questionnaire.
Ten questions were each written to reflect a positive attribute of the wetland
waste water treatment concept. Ten more questions were each written to
reflect a negative aspect of the same concept.
The 20 questions were each defined in writing for the five panelmem-
bers, regarding the intended purpose of the question. The panel members
each made written comments about any concerns he/she might have about117
any of the questions. The concerns were addressed by revising the ques-
tions, and the process was repeated until there was an agreement on each
question by four of the five panel members on all 20 questions (Appendix B).
Part two of the data was collected in audio-taped interviews where
each subject explained his/her knowledge and reasoning about a local
decision to adopt or reject a policy for construction of a wetland to help
purify waste water. In a face-to-face interview, each subject was asked to
respond to seven questions grouped into three parts. They were as follows:
Part A: Personal Content Knowledge
Question 1: What do you know about the use of construded wetlands for
the treatment of municipal waste water?
Question 2: Have you learned more about this since becoming involved in
the decision process of your cily?
Question 3: What did you know about the subject before you became
involved?
Part B: Decision Commitment
Question 4: Did you support or oppose the adoption of this water treatment
method in your city?118
Question 5: Why did you take this position?
Part C: Alternative Epistemology
Question 6: Were there other points of view in the group you worked with?
Question 7: Can you give some examples of those other points of view?
Overview of Interviews
The interviews revealed that most of the subjects knewvery little about
the decision context before they became involved in the decisionprocess. A
majority of the subjects stated that most of what they had learnedwas while
they were involved in their respective decision processes. Yet, therewas a
wide variation in the way each subject explained his/her personal under-
standing of the wetland waste water treatment concept. Additionally, there
were distinct differences between the two groups regarding how the new
information was obtained. In City B, some staff members from Public Works
presented the new information to the decision makers. In City A,a small
group of volunteers presented the new information to the decision makers.
In the City B interviews, there were four subjects who supported and
seven subjects who opposed the use of a constructed wetland to treat local
waste water. In the City A interviews one subject opposed, and 12 subjects
supported a pilot project with a constructed wetland as part ofan upgraded
system to treat local waste water. Within each community group, a specific119
concern was expressed about local resources that was different and unique
to each city.In City B, there was a general concern about the high cost and
limited amount of land that would be suitable for constructing and maintain-
ing a wetland treatment facility.In the City A area, the resource of most
concern to the subjects was the water in the local streams.
The effluent from a waste water treatment plant was described as a
valuable resource by most of the subjects from the City A group. In contrast,
most of the subjects in the City B group described the effluent from a waste
wafer treatment plant as a liability.In addition to the general concerns from
each group that were described above, there was a wide range of reasoning
expressed by the different individuals from both groups regarding the use of
a constructed wetland for treatment of the local waste water. The partici-
pants in the study have diverse backgrounds and occupations, as well as
differing types and levels of education. The design of this study did not
specifically focus on the individual features of each subject however, some
anecdotal details may be useful.
Some subjects were reluctant to answer questions regarding their
education, and for that reason there was no further attempt to ask such
questions.It is entirely possible that some or all of the subjects were selective
in their responses to the interview questions. For example, some might have
been aware of differing viewpoints or opposing arguments, but chose not to
discuss them in the interview. Any information that was obtained from the120
subjects about their personal experience and backgroundswas given in their
responses to the first three questions under the Part A: Personal Content
Knowledge section of the audiotaped interview. A short review of there-
sponses will provide some insight about each subject. The responses will not
be evaluated in this review, and the individuals will be referred to by subject
number only.If the occupation of a subject was revealed during the inter-
view,ifis included in the following demographic summaries.
Subject #1 was a volunteer who is a restaurant owner and specialty
farmer with a high school education. This subject referred to other projects
as the main source of information about the wetland concept.
Subject #2 was a volunteer who is a retired engineer. This subject
referred to past work experience and a technical backgroundas the main
sources of information about the wetland concept.
Subject #3 was city council person with an unknown level of educa-
tion. This subject referred to involvement in the decisionprocess, and
personal reading as the main sources of information about the wetland
concept.
Subject #4 was a city council person with an unknown level of educa-
tion. This subject referred to personal experience in the outdoorsas the main
source of information about the wetland concept.
Subject #5 was a volunteer who is retired froma career in aviation.
This subject did not reveal any specific educational background, but referred121
to government documents and some experts from other projects as the main
sources of information about the wetland concept.
Subject #6 was a volunteer who is a retired sewage treatment plant
manager. This subject did not reveal any specific education, but referred to
past work and other personal experience as the main sources of information
about the wetland concept.
Subject #7 was a city council person who owns and operatesa local
bed and breakfast business. This subject referred to other projects, and to
some personal observations as the main sources of information about the
wetland concept.
Subject #8 was a volunteer who is an environmental planner. This
subject referred to a personal friend who is an engineer, and other projects
as the main sources of information about the wetland concept.
Subject #9 was a city council person with an unknown level of educa-
tion. This subject referred to personal study, involvement in group discus-
sions, and projects in other areas of the world as the main sources of infor-
motion about the wetland concept.
Subject #10 was a volunteer with an international background and
diversified education related to environmental issues. This subject referred to
projects in other countries and local experts as the main sources of informa-
tion about the wetland concept.122
Subject #11 was a volunteer with a B.S. degree in engineering. This
subject referred to other projects and personal reading as the main sources
of information about the wetland concept.
Subject #12 was a city council person with a PhD in political science.
This subject referred to the local citizens who advocated wetlands as a means
to purify waste water as the main source of information about the wetlands
concept.
Subject #13 was a retired volunteer with a B.S. degree in botany.
This subject referred to past work experience for the Road Department in
California, and other projects as the main sources of information about the
wetland concept. This subject also mentioned that some species of wetland
plants are useful for cleaning up the petroleum residues along highways.
This individual was involved in constructing three wetlands to remove various
chemical pollutants from runoff water.
Subject #14 was a city council person with an unknown level of
education. This subject referred to various personal observations and other
experiences as the main sources of information about the wetland concept.
Subject #15 was a city council person with an unknown level of
education. This subject referred to some discussions in the public decision
process, and a visit to a constructed wetland as the main sources of informa-
tion about the wetland concept.123
Subject #16 was a city council person with an unknown level of
education. This subject referred to projects in other cities, and to presenta-
tions by staff members during the local decision process as the main sources
of information about the wetland concept.
Subject #17 was a city council person with a strong background in life
science, who was also working on a M.S. degree in a related field. This
subject referred to the local decision process as the main source of informa-
tion about the wetland concept.
Subject #18 was a volunteer who works as a chemical engineer. This
subject referred to presentations by another engineering firm that was
providing consulting services during the decision process, as an important
source of information about the wetland concept. This individual also
mentioned some personal work experience which involved a detailed evalua-
tion of various constructed wetlands, and their effectiveness for removing
industrial wastes.
Subject #19 was a volunteer who has done engineering in the waste
water treatment field. This subject referred to personal reading about
projects in other cities as the main source of information about the wetland
concept.
Subject #20 was a volunteer who has a professional background as a
consulting engineer. This sublect referred to personal work experience,124
seminars, and other private studies as the main sources of information about
the wetland concept.
Subject #21 was a cily council person with an unknown level of
education. This subject referred to a personal acquaintance, and to city staff
members as the main sources of information about the wetland concept.
Subject #22 was a city council member with an unknown level of
education, who owns an automotive repair business. This subject referred to
reports as the main source of information about the wetland concept.
Subject #23 was a city council person with an unknown level of
education. This subject referred to reports by the citizens as the main source
of information about the wetland concept.
Subject #24 was a volunteer who is an engineering professor. This
subject referred to reading, personal analysis, reports from an engineering
firm, and group discussions as the main sources of information about the
wetland concept.
Subjects 1-13 were from the City A group, and subjects 14-24 were
from the City B group. Each subject's audio-taped interview was transcribed
and qualitatively analyzed to identify Critical Thinking Operations (CTO) or
Fallacious Thinking Patterns (FTP) that were employed in his or her reason-
ing. The distribution of ICB scores was analyzed quantitatively for each
separate community group, and for the Iwo groups combined. The descrip-
tive statistics appear in Table 2. The range of ICB scores for both communi-125
ties combined was +2 to +39. The range of scores for the City B subjects
was +2 to +31, and the range for the City A subjeds was +18 to +39.
These distributions are illustrated in a bar graph on page 126.126
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for Cily B and City A ICB values.
City B CityA CityBandCityA
Variable ICB ICB combined ICB
Sample size 11 1 3 24
Average 20.36 26.62 23.75
Median 24 26 25.5
Mode 24 30 30
Geometric mean 16.52 25.89 21.07
Variance 90.25 40.76 70.63
Standard deviation 9.50 6.38 8.40
Standard error 2.86 1.77 1.72
Minimum 2 18 2
Maximum 31 39 39
Range 29 21 37
Lowerquartile 14 21 19
Upper quartile 27 30 30
lnferquartile range 13 9
Skewness -0.95 0.17 -0.91
Standardized skewness -1.29 0.26 -1.8
Kurtosis -0.05 -0.50 1.19
Standardized kurtosis -0.03 -0.37 1.19
Distribution of ICB scores for City B and City A.
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Analysis for Research Question One
Can specific "critical thinking" operations be identified in the reason-
ing used by each subject to explain his/her decision regarding a wetland
waste water treatment policy?
To objectively rate the responses of each subject regarding his/her
personal knowledge and reasoning about the wetland waste water treatment
concept, section A of each interview was rated on a scale from 1 -10, based
on the 10 critical thinking operations (CTO) cited by Zeidler et al. (1992).
Also, the reasoning of each subject in both sections B and section C were
rated by the same set of critical thinking operations and scored on the 1-10
point scale. These critical thinking operations are presented as follows:
1)distinguishing beiween verifiable facts and value claims;
2)distinguishing relevant from irrelevant information, claims, or
reasons;
3)determining the factual accuracy of a statement;
4)determining the credibility of a source;
5)identifying ambiguous claims or arguments;
6)identifying unstated assumptions;
7)detecting bias;
8)identifying logical fallacies;
9)recognizing logical inconsistencies in a line of reasoning;128
10) determining the strength of an argument or claim (p. 439).
The ten CTOs shown above are listed in hierarchical order, and
numbered from simple to complex. In this analysis, a corresponding numeri-
cal value was used to represent each of them, advancing from 1 for the
simplest to 10 for the most complex. Parts A, B and C of each interview were
rated with the number of the most complex ClO that could be identified in
that section of each interview. The three scores for the responses in parts A,
B and C were totaled to obtain a cumulative CTO value for each subject.
The followingIwoexamples will illustrate the scoring of the responses.
One example is a subject from City A, and the other is a subject from City B.
These two subjects achieved a different level of reasoning in each of the
three parts of their interviews. The content of theseIwointerviews is some-
what representative of most of the other interviews in their respective commu-
nities.It should be noted that neither of these two subjects displayed any of
the fallacious thinking patterns identified in the analysis of the data for
research questionIwo.
Example One: Subject #17
Part A: Personal Content Knowledge
Question 1: What do you know about the use of constructed wetlands for
the treatment of municipal wastewater?129
Response:I have a real basic understanding of the process. Urn... in a
totally non-scientific way.I know that the storm water would be conveyed
into the wetland where it would basically sit there for a while.., while the
biological processes broke down the different toxins then it would, I believe it
would then go info a second settling pond before it would be moved back
into the rest of the system. And it would be used as an alternative to a pipe
and process system.
In the response to question 1, this subject made a claim that biologi-
cal processes were a relevant part of the wetland treatment process. Yet, the
sub jed did not present reasons why this was a fadual statement.
Question 2: Have you learned more about this since becoming involved in
the decision process for your city?
Response: I've learned everything I know about it since we began.
Question 3: What did you know about the process before becoming in-
volved?
Response: Before? Well before the process I knew nothing about it.Based on the response to question 1, part A was scored at a CTO
complexity level of (2).
Fart B: Decision Commitment
130
Question 4: Did you support or oppose the adoption of this water treatment
method for your city?
Response:I don't think it was really either.I was interested in pursuing it as
an option, but in terms of it being a real decision making point, itreally
never was... I'm not even sure at the community level if it really ever was.It
was brought to the large group and everyone said, "let's just not worry about
it then."
Question 5: Why did you take this position?
Response: What I remember is that staff came forward with a series of
piping processes to deal with the CSO's and a group of citizens came
forward and said, "Hey wait a second, there are constructed wetlands that
may be able to do this." And then staff and the consultant and some citizens
went on and had a separate work group, but I wasn't able to offend, to look
at how likely that was to work here given the infrastructure cost, the DEQ and
EPA permits, and just the sheer size of the problem that we had. And the
decision was made by that group that it was not a viable option for this city131
because... we... nobody including EPA or DEQ came out and said "you are
never going get a permit,"... Yeah, they said, it's urn... it's atthat pointifwas
too untested, the technology for them to be willing to risk the public's health
and that if we wanted to do a test project we could but it would need to be
really small and it became so cost prohibitive that if was taken off the list of
options pretty early.
In the response to question 5, this subject expressed some doubt
about the credibility of the wetland treatment option. On this basis, the
subject did not believe that the city should rely on a large treatment system
that would use untested technology.
Based on this reasoning, part B was scored at a CTO complexity level of (4).
Part C: Alternative Epistemology
Question 6: Were there other points of view in the group you worked with?
Response: Urn... Well are you talking about the city council or the commu-
nily as a whole. A lot of the folks that came to those work sessions um...
didn't want to go with untested technology.
Question 7: Can you give some examples of those other points of view?132
Response: They didn't think it was worth the infrastructure cost. They didn't
want to have to deal with the land thatifwould be required.It would take
productive land out,.. .or they saw productive land being taken out of the
buildable lands inventory urn... let's see, uh that's probably the big reasons.
In the response to question 7, this subject identified some concerns of
other people about using land for the construction of wetlands, that could be
used for other development. This was an assumption that was not clearly
stated, but was just identified as what, "they saw". Based on this response,
part C was scored at a CTO complexily level of (6).
The cumulative CTO score for subject #17 was (12).
Example Two: Subject #3
Part A: Personal Content Knowledge
Question 1: What do you know about the use of constructed wetlands for
the treatment of municipal wastewater?
Response:I know in certain areas it's worked very well, but you know we
have slightly different standards than where its been used before. And, that's
what we're trying to test out is whether it can meet different kinds of stan-
dards. Essentially the main one is, or the main problem that we... the main133
problem that we have is uh, is that we have a prelly stringent phosphorus
limit for what we can discharge into the... into Bear Creek, and uh, there's a
question as to whether or not constructed wetlands can bring that down low
enough to meet that standard. But, there may be other benefits that we can
still use it for, whether it's directly related to our waste water or, or, the storm
drains, that we may be able to use construded wetlands to help clean and
polish that water. So, that's basically what I know right now about how they
work.
This subjed was careful to point out some specific details about the
local waste water problems, and to give reasons why the local situation was
different from others where the wetland method had been used successfully.
Question 2: Have you learned more about this since becoming involved in
the decision process for your cily?
Response: Yeah. It's been about a Iwo and a half year program, and it's
just sort of really right at the stage right now where we're probably starting to
get some data out ofif.I haven't yet diredly gotten any, received any reports
on it.So, uh I don't really know yet, exadly how, what, how it's working or
what it's effects are on our partkular situation yet.134
In the response to question 2, the subled was cautious about making
a statement about new knowledge without providing evidence to supportthe
statement.
Question 3: What did you know about the process before becoming in-
volved?
Response: About wetlands? Nothing.I mean I knew what wetlands were, I
mean normal, natural... wetlands, and I had a general sense of what their
role was in the ecosystem, and that sort of thing. And, that they were uh that
natural wetlands had been construded over and drained, and you know
basically were on a decline in the country, as a whole. But, as far as a part
of an adual city municipal waste water treatment facility, I knew nothing
about it until we got into that.
Based on the responses to questions 1 and 2, part A was scored at a
CTO complexity level of (4).
Part B: Decision Commitment
Question 4: Did you support or oppose the adoption of this water treatment
method for your city?
Response: Well, uh I was in favor of it, yeah.135
Question 5: Why did you take this position?
Response: Well one, because adually you know, one of the other problems
that we have in ours is that we have a creek... especially, you know our
major problem is, is uh, is summer discharge into Bear Creek, that's when
we don't meet the new standards. And, uh, because it's aflow problem...
you know, basically in winter there's much more waterthat runs down Bear
Creek, and so like they say, dilution is the solution. And, uh so, you know
what, we discharge the same kind of water year round it's just that in the
summer there is much less water flowing through BearCreek. Therefore, it
becomes a bigger share of the creek, and then it's, and then it goes over the
standards, for not only phosphorous, but for some other ones. But, those
are some new standards, I mean before that came up seven oreight years
ago we were meeting what the currentstandards were in all the national
clean water standards. But, those are changed and updated... and uh so,
we didn't meet those new ones. And, basically summer time iswhen we
don't meet them, and that we have to either clean it to the point where we
can continue to discharge, or we have to pull it out ofthe creek. And, the
problem with that then, is that it is, there are times when it's fifly to sevenly
five percent of the total flow of Bear Creek, is our discharge. So, it's just kind
of funny to us that uh... it would be not.., you know we didn't think it was
really good that we would uh that... we would have to pull out of the creek136
and then there would be even less water. We didn't think that would be real
helpful for the fish. And, if there was even less water it would probably heat
up even more, and the temperature problem would get worse. So, so uh,
we've always made a commitment that one way or another we would
replace the water if we had to pull out. But, what we're hoping is that the
wetlands will polish it enough that we will be able to continue to discharge
even during the summer.
This subject was able to articulate the local problems with the clean
water standards in such a way that some logical fallacies were identified.
The subject recognized logical inconsistencies in the line of reasoning that
would require the water to be reduced at a time when the greatest harm
would be caused to Bear Creek.
Based on the responses to question 5, part B was scores at a ClO
complexity level of (9).
Part C: Alternative Epistemology
Question 6: Were there other points of view in the group you worked with?
Response: Uh, well just that uh, well I mean, there were some people that
thought we just ought to just hook up to the regional sewer plant and be
done withif.137
Question 7: Can you give some examples of those other points of view?
Response: Oh, just, just, generally that they thought a regional solution was
probably better. And, too at the time when we first started it looked like it
was the cheapest solution. In the long term it turned out that wasn't correct.
At the time when we were first beginning the discussions, and near the end
of the time when we were starting to make our decisions, oh... it appeared
that it was a cheaper solution, and that's not necessarily the case anymore.I
mean what we found when we actually got in to the construction time... that
it's actually, with everything that we're doing, prelly close to the same. Over
a twenty year life it will, you know with our plant hooking up to that system,
cost was down to a point where there wasn't really that big of a difference.
That would be my sense of it.I don't think that anyone in the general sense
opposed the wetland part of it, other than that they thought that it may not
work, and that it was oh... that we had a cheaper alternative. But, there was
some social value, and some potential value of our own effluent that we
would have been giving up. For instance, that wetlands provide wildlife
habitat, and they obviously provide an open space area. So, again we were
talking value, not in an economic sense, but in a community sense. Also, in
the future, technology might change and we might find other ways to use our
effluent. We just thought it was best to keep control of that resource.138
In the response to question 7, this subject was able to identify some
ambiguous claims and unstated assumptions of those who were initially
opposed to the wetland treatment method.
Part C was scored at a ClO complexity level of(6).
The cumulative CTO score for subjed #3 was (18).
The table below illustrates the CTO complexity levels of all subjects.
The range of CTO scores for the 24 subjects was 0-22. Seven of the
sub jeds scored in the lower quartile range 0-2. Seven of the subjects scored
in the upper quartile range9.5-22.The other 10 subjects had CTO scores
located within the interquartile range from 2-9. The average score was6.9,
and the median score was4.5.139
Table 3. Cily A and City B CTO scores.
Subject# CTO Part A CTO Part B CTO Part CCumulative
------ Complexity ----------- Total
City A scores
1 5 5 6 16
2 9 9 1 19
3 4 9 5 18
4 0 0 2 2
5 5 1 1 7
6 1 0 0 1
7 1 1 0 2
8 2 2 0 4
9 2 1 2 5
10 0 4 4 8
11 0 1 0 1
12 4 2
2 0
3
0
9
2 1
City B Scores
14 0 0 0 0
15 3 1 3 7
16 1 2 0 3
17 2 4 6 12
18 5 3 2 10
19 1 2 4 7
20 6 3 6 15
21 1 0 1 2
22 2 2 0 4
23 0 2 1 3
24 7 10 5 22140
Data Analysis for Research Question Two
Can any "fallacious thinking" patterns be identified in the reasoning
used by each of the community leaders to explain his/her decision regarding
the adoption of a wetland waste water treatment policy?
The following are 11 common reasoning fallacies that have been
identified in the informal arguments of some science students during class-
room discussions. They are the patterns of interest in this study. Each
transcribed interview was analyzed to determine if any of these fallacious
thinking patterns (FTP) are manifest in the reasoning of each the 24 sub jeds
in this study.
Pattern A: Ad hominem argument
Pattern B: Appeal to popularity
Pattern C: False dilemma
Pattern D: Begging the question
Pattern E: Hasty generalization
Pattern F: Appeal to authority
Pattern G: Fallacies of ambiguity
Pattern H: Fallacies of equivocation
Pattern I:Normative reasoning
Pattern J: Naive conceptions of argument structure141
Pattern K: Altering representation of argument
In order to analyze the data in a systematic way, the seven interview
questions are grouped as suggested by D. L. Zeidler (personal communica-
tion, April 18, 1998), into three parts: A - Personal Content Knowledge; B -
Decision Commitment; CAlternative Epistemology. Part A is the combined
responses to questions 1, 2 and 3; part B is the combined responses to
questions 4 and 5; part C is the combined responses to questions 6 and 7.
The following three samples will illustrate how the responses were
analyzed and rated for FTPs that were identified. The three subjects used as
examples were selected because their responses exhibited an array of
reasoning that was representative of most subjects in the study who displayed
thinking fallacies. These responses also included the FTPs that were identi-
fled the most frequently in this study.
Example One: Subject #6
Part A: Personal Content Knowledge
Question 1: What do you know about the use of constructed wetlands for
treatment of municipal wasfewater?142
Response: Well, it will take out the impurities, but at the end of the line the
plants will consume it, and take care of the phosphorus and the ammonias.
And, what more does the DEQ want?
Question 2: Have you learned more about this since becoming involved in
the decision process of your cily?
Response: Uh, I don't remember how far back the wetlands... uh, the wet-
lands, per se is down there.I can't remember what year we started working
them.
Question 3: What did you know about this before you became involved?
Response: Yes, I've known of different cities and their jobs of what they do.
And, I've visited other places to see what they do. Yeah, there's a plant
down there in Arcata, California that's doing this. And, I learned a lot from
that. And, there's a plant down there, South of Reno, by Lake Tahoe, and
that's a great thing. They're pumping their effluent over a mountain, seven
miles over there, and I've visited over there. They're puffing it in a lake, and
when it gets in there, it's purified by air...and uh, by air going across, and
the workings of the lake. And, as far as I know, people swim in that lake...143
and fish in it, and boat.It's a recreation lake, but if those people knew
where it was coming from, they probably wouldn't do it.
Subject #6 made hasty generalizations on the basis of personal
experience. The responses in part A, lacked substantial evidence and were
based on what this subject intuitively believed to be the case.
Part B: Decision Commitment
Question 4: Did you support or oppose the adoption of this water treatment
method in your city?
Response:I think it's a great thing. Yeah, I was sold on it when they first
started talking about it.It's just a little walk from the plant to go out through
this.
Question 5: Why did you take this position?
Response: To be more efficient, it would be more efficient. And, as a side
benefit, it would make a beautiful park down there.
Again, subject #6 made hasty generalizations and used a "make
sense" approach in part B. There was a failure to scrutinize the validity or144
form of the responses, with use of a more heuristic approach that led to a
quick and uncomplicated conclusion.
Part C: Alternative Epistemology
Question 6: Were there other points of view in the group you worked with?
Response: Well, I don't know of anybody that's against it, unless it might be
one or two members of the cily council.
Question 7: Can you give some examples of those other points of view?
Response:I can't see why they would be against it, and I can't see why any
people living in the area. ..there's nobody living close to it. And uh, I can't
see why anybody would be against it, if if could do the job. They got a
ridiculous thing down here they just got through building in, to...to pump the
effluent back up into the head of this.. .some kind of a wetlands thing we've
got, that cost a heck of a lot of money to build it.It's supposed to flow
through that, and when it comes out of that it's supposed to be ready to
drink.. .but it may have to be chlorinated. Now that's another thing, they're
talking about going from chlorination to this process of using sunlight or
something. Now they're afraid of chlorine! Afraid that uh, the DEQ and
everybody is scared to death of chlorine, and I've handled that stuff by the
two ton.. .by the, yeah, my tanks was ton tanks. They held a ton of chlorine,145
and I handled that stuff, I've sniffed it... I've gotten the chlorine symptoms, but
the people are scared to death of it.But, chlorine is heavier than air, and if
you get a chlorine leak in your tank or anything, it's going to go to the lowest
area. Well, they end up down there in the creek, there was a bunch of it
leaked. ..and I was never afraid of that stuff. But, people are scared to death
of something they don't know about. So, they're going to go... I don't know if
they have yet or not.. .of uh, killing the bacteria in the effluent instead of
using chlorine. With some kind of a x-ray thing or ray...some sun's rays into
it to kill the bacteria. That's what they say, probably when they get to using
it, in a few years, they'll decide it didn't work.
Subject #6 relied on a make-sense epistemology throughout the
interview. The responses for parts A, B and C all indicated a naive concep-
tion of argument structure. There were hasty generalizations in parts A and
B. This FTP was indicated by the statement, "Yeah, I was sold on it when they
first started talking about it", and by the subject advancing claims on the
basis of personal experience.
The subject made an appeal to popularity in part C response, by the
statements, "Well, I don't know of anybody that's against it", and I can't see
why they would be against it". The part C responses also revealed an ad
hominem argument, with the subject's attack on others with different points
of view. This subject also displayed normative reasoning in part C. This was146
indicated by the subject's limited abilily to objectively comprehend, evaluate,
and retain or reject the ideas of others (Zeidler et al., 1992).
Example Two: Subject #13
Part A: Personal Content Knowledge
Question 1: What do you know about the use of constructed wetlands for
treatment of municipal wastewafer?
Response: Well uh,...l've been very interested in the wetlands project devel-
oped by the cily of Arcata, California.I studied it and followed it's progress
since it was first started.I also became aware many years ago that, uh...
some wetlands species of plants are able to clean up the petroleum residues
along highways.
Question 2: Have you learned more about this since becoming involved in
the decision process of your city?
Response: Yes. I've studied the Mount Angel project in Oregon and, uh. ..a
city in Washington, while we were trying to develop a plan for City A.
Question 3: What did you know about this before you became involved?147
Response: Well, uh...actually I have been aware of the value of wetlands for
many years.I was educated as a botanist, but. ..for much of my life, I worked
for the Road Department in California. During that time, I was actually
involved in constructing three wetlands. Two of them were, uh. ..near estuar-
ies, and oh.. .the other one was used to clean up industrial run off.
No FTPs were identified in part A of this subject's interview.
Part B: Decision Commitment
Question 4: Did you support or oppose the adoption of this water treatment
method in your cily?
Response: Oh, I strongly supported it.
Question 5: Why did you take this position?
Response: Well, mostly because oh. ..it's environmentally friendly. And,.. .we
are located on the Pacific Flyway and wetland habitat is needed by migrating
waterfowl. We liked the idea of an area that could be used by the public as
a park, where people can go to see wildlife and plant life, it just makes good
sense.148
The response to question 5 revealed incorrect reasoning that was
based on the vested interests of the subject's own group and a societal
viewpoint. Subject #13 used "make sense" approach without giving ode-
quate reasons to substantiate the conclusion. The focus of the response
shifted from the purification of waste water to the "idea of a park and
wetland habitat for waterfowl."
Part C: Alternative Epistemology
Question 6: Were there other points of view in the group you worked with?
Response: Yes, uh. ..some people wanted to just pipe it to Medford, and,
uh... there were others who wanted to build a new conventional treatment
plant here in City A, but uh...most of these people were quite ignorant about
wetlands in general, and they knew nothing about the idea of using wetlands
to purify waste water.
Question 7: Can you give some examples of those other points of view?
Response: Well, uh. ..we used newspaper articles and some public speaking
to educate those who opposed wetlands and the opposition dissolved.
Especially the those that favored the local plant for conventional treatment.149
Subject #13 exhibited normative reasoning in parts B and C by an
egocentric form of reasoning, and a limited open-mindedness. This pattern
was indicated by the response "we used newspaper articles and some public
speaking to educate those who opposed wetlands, and the opposition
dissolved". A hasly generalization was indicated in part C by the lack of
sufficient or appropriate evidence to support the sub jed's claim. The subject
presented an ad hominem argument in the statement, "most of these people
were quite ignorant about wetlands in general, and they knew nothing about
the idea of using wetlands to purify waste water. In part B, the represenfa-
tion of argument was altered by shifting the focus from waste water to
wildlife habitat and a public park. This subjed revealed a naive conception
of argument structure by presenting some underdeveloped arguments in
parts B and C, and by attending to counterevidence in a cavalier manner
(Zeidler et al., 1992).
Example Three: Subject #21
Part A: Personal Content Knowledge
Question 1: What do you know about the use of constructed wetlands for
treatment of municipal wastewater?
Response: Very little.150
Question 2: Have you learned more about this since becoming involved in
the decision process of your cily?
Response: No.
Question 3: What did you know about this before you became involved?
Response:It was one of the alternatives for treatment, but it was not the best
or most effective way.
Subject #21 admittedly knew very little about the constructed wetland
treatment concept, and did not seem to be interested in any confirming
evidence to support the decision to reject it.
Part B: Decision Commitment
Question 4: Did you support or oppose the adoption of this water treatment
method in your cily?
Response:I opposed it.
Question 5: Why did you take this position?151
Response:I was greatly influenced by a person who offended the hearing
who was very much opposed to the idea based on his knowledge.I relied
very heavily.., how effective it would be based on his knowledge.
Again, in the responses for part B, this subject made a hasty general-
ization with a lack of personal information to support the decision. Instead,
subject #21 relied on advice from an individual who may or may not have
knowledge that is relevant to the issue.
Part C: Alternative Epistemology
Question 6: Were there other points of view in the group you worked with?
Response:I can't remember any. Staff were skeptical of it...Cify Staff
opposed it.
Question 7: Can you give some examples of those other points of view?
Response: Some in the audience were very much in favor of it. Environmen-
tally acceptableI think.
Subject #21 made hasty generalizations in parts A, B and C. This
was indicated by a lack of attention to evidence or counter-evidence, and the
short responses to the questions. The subject made an appeal to authority in152
parts B and C, by relying on an other person to make the decision on the
waste water issue. This subject indicated a naive conception of argument
structure by attending to opposing points of view with a cavalier attitude.
The subject used normative reasoning in the part C responses with an
egocentric lack of open-mindedness (Zeidler et al., 1992).
The 24 subjects in the study are listed by number in the table below,
with columns for parts A, B and C, and for the total.If an FTP was identified
in any of the three parts, it is represented by a letter corresponding with one
of the patterns. The total number of FTPs for each subject is shown in the
last column.
There were a total of 89 FTPs identified in the 24 interviews. Nine of
the subjects displayed (0) FTPs in any of their responses. The average
number was 3.75. Six of the eleven FTPs listed above were identified fewer
than five times: Pattern B, (1); Pattern C, (0); Pattern D, (1); Pattern F, (1);
Pattern G, (1); and Pattern H, (4). Pattern K was identified (8) times. Pattern
A was identified (6) times, and only in Part C responses. The three FTPs
observed most frequently in this study were: Pattern E, (18); Pattern I, (21);
Pattern J, (28).153
Table 4. The Fallacious Thinking Patterns identified from each interview.
Cily A Subjects
Subject# FTP Part A FTP Part B FTP Part C Total
1 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
4IJ 2 J 1 AJ 2 5
5 0 0 0 0
6EJ 2 EJ 2ABIJ 4 8
7El 2EIJ 3liK 3 8
8IJ 2EIJ 3 DEJ 3 8
9 0 0 0 0
10 I 1JK 2AIJ 3 7
11El 2EJ 2 AJ 2 6
12 0 0 0 0
13 0uK 3AEIJ 4 7
City B Subjects
14GHIK4HIJK 4AHIK4 12
15 0 0 0 0
16 H 1EIJK 4 EIJ 3 8
17 0 0 0 0
18 0 0uK 3 3
19 0EIJ 3 0 3
20 0 0 0 0
21 E 1EF 2 EIJ 3 6
22Ii 2 EJ 2 J 1 5
23 0 E 1 EJ 2 3
24 0 0 0 0154
Analysis for Research Question Three
Can a pattern be identified between each subject's initial core beliefs,
and the reasoning he/she used to explain a decision regarding a wetland
waste water treatment policy?
In Table 5, each of the 24 sub jed's ICB score is listed in the first
column, with the lowest value at the top and ending at the bottom with the
highest value. In the second column, the total number of fallacious thinking
patterns for each subject is shown. In the third column, the cumulative total
of each subject's critical thinking operations is shown. The last column
shows the number assigned to each subject for this study. The nine subjects
who displayed zero FTPs in their reasoning had ICB scores located within the
interquartile range from +19 to +30. The ICB scores for these individuals
were closer to the median (+25.5), and the average score (+23.75) than
most of the subjeds with FTPs in their reasoning. With the exception of
subjects #6 and #23, all of the subjects who exhibited thinking fallacies had
ICB scores in the upper or lower quartiles of the ICB score distribution.
The table does not show an obvious pattern between the ICB scores
and the levels of critical thinking used by the subjects. However, an indirect
connection is suggested by the significant negative correlation between the
CTO and the FTP variables. A regression analysis using the data from
research questions one and Iwo was performed. The results indicate a
correlation coefficient of -0.70,R2=48.49 for thoseIwovariables. The155
Table 5. The values for the three variables shown for each sublect.
ICB FTP CTO Subject
+2 3 10 #18
+6 6 2 #21
+14 5 4 #22
+18 8 2 #7
+18 8 4 #8
+19 3 7 #19
+19 0 18 #3
+20 0 22 #24
+21 8 1 #6*
+24 0 12 #17
+25 0 3 #15
+25 0 7 #5
+26 0 19 #2
+26 0 9 #12
+26 0 6 #20
+27 3 3 #23*
+30 0 16 #1
+30 6 8 #10
+30 5 2 #4
+30 8 3 #16
+31 6 1 #11
+31 12 0 #14
+33
+9
2
7
5
7
#9
#1
numerical values for the CTOs and FTPs of each subject are listed in Table 3
under those headings. On the basis of the regression analysis, and the
obvious pattern between the ICB scores and the FTP variable, it is possible
that the CTO variable may also be indirectly influenced by core beliefs.156
Another possible influence on the CTO variable is each subject's specific
educational background. This possibilily is discussed in Chapter V.
Summary of Findings
The variables of primary interest in this study were: ICB, CTO, and
FTP. Some descriptive statistics for those 3 variables are shown in Table 6
below. The results discussed in Chapter IV, suggest the following patterns of
interest within the context of adult reasoning about public policy decisions
that may have an impact the environment.
1)The initial core beliefs of each person can influence his/her
personal perception of a decision context, yet it appears that this
perception may be moderated by social influences.
2)There is some indication that strong commitment to these initial
core beliefs is related to a higher incidence of fallacious thinking,
yet this may be moderated by experience and training in critical
thinking skills.
3)The malorily of the fallacious reasoning patterns that were identi-
fied in this study were related to errors in the correct use of
evidence to support a position on an issue.
4)The group distribution of scores for initial core beliefs showed
that most of the people who scored within the interquartiles had
no fallacious thinking patterns identified in their reasoning.157
5)The people who scored in the upper and lower quartiles all had
fallacious thinking patterns identified in their reasoning.
6)There was a strong relationship shown between high levels of
critical thinking and a low incidence of thinking fallacies.
Table 6. A summary of the descriptive statistics for the three variables.
Variable ICB CTO FTP
Sample size 24 24 24
Average 23.75 6.92 3.75
Median 25.5 4.5 3
Mode 30 2 0
Geometric mean 21.07 -33 -33
Variance 70.63 39.21 13.07
Standard deviation 8.40 6.26 3.61
Standard error 1 .72 1.28 0.74
Minimum 2 0 0
Maximum 39 22 12
Range 37 22 12
Lower quartile 19 2 0
Upper quartile 30 9.5 6.5
lnterquartile range 11 7.5 6.5
Skewness -0.91 1.16 0.46
Standardized skewness -1.81 2.33 0.92
Kurtosis 1.19 0.37 -0.81
Standardized kurfosis 1.19 0.37 -0.81158
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to examine some of the reasoning of
adult decision makers from two different cities that were faced with similar
problems concerning local waste water. The data from the Iwo groups were
analyzed to determine the individual patterns of thinking used by the sub jects
to explain their respective group policy decisions for local waste water
treatment. In his inquiry regarding the reasoning of students during class-
room discussions, Zeidler (1997) categorized distinct patterns of both critical
thinking and fallacious thinking, which he believes are influenced by individ-
ual core beliefs.
It was the aim of the current study to determine whether the same
thinking patterns can be identified in the reasoning that the adult subjects
used to solve local environmental problems. The results pertaining to the
three research questions are discussed in this chapter.It should be noted
that the focus of the current study was limited to the qualitative features
contained in those three questions, and to the specific context of theIwo
community decisions,It is not implied that any of the results or conclusions
can be generalized beyond those parameters. In addition to the conclusions
and associated discussions are some comments concerning the limitations of159
the study, implications for future public policy decisions, recommendations
for educational practice, and some suggestions for future research.
Discussion and Condusions
The samples of thought that were examined in this study revealed that
the subjects used a wide range of critical thinking operations (CTO) in their
informal reasoning. The variation suggests that the 24 sub jects in the study
were not equal in their ability to make judgementsabout the scientific
problems they were trying to solve. This situation raises some questions
about the basis of individual differences in the development of reasoning
ability. All of the subjects are mature adults, and are assumed to be intellec-
tually mature as well.If this assumption is correct, it would be meaningful to
examine some reasons for these differences.
Prior studies by Piaget (1948) and Kohlberg (1973, 1976) have
suggested that development in reasoning ability may be expected to increase
in stages as an individual matures. Rest (1974, 1976, 1979) and Rest et al.
(1974) implicated personal value commitments as a determining factor for
the reasoning level used by individuals in forming moral judgements.
Zeidler & Schafer (1984) argued that, "altitudes toward the content embed-
ded in the issue, the perceived value of the issue, experience in dealing with
the issue or related issues, his or her knowledge of content related to the
issue" may help determine the level of reasoning used by an individual"
(p.2).Ir.
The basis for the range of CTOs employed by the subjects in this study
may be that they had different levels of reasoning ability or different levels of
commitment toward the issue. The design of the study did not address the
means by which the subjects acquired their reasoning skills, but only the level
of skill used in one specific decision context. Furthermore, the data give no
indication whether each subject used the highest level of reasoning he/she
was capable of using. However, in two studies by Kuhn et al. (1988) and
Kuhn (1992) it was implied that the skills of reasoning may be learned with
training and practice. Accordingly, it should be noted that various types of
formal education, personal knowledge related to wetlands, and individual
experience in dealing with municipal water treatment may be causal factors
that affected the range of CTOs used by the subjects.
It has been the goal of educators to develop their "students as rational
beings, capable of informed policy judgements with respect to science and
society" (Zeidler,1 984a). The presumption is that formal education, and the
daily experiences of life in our society are factors that contribute to the
reasoning capabilities of citizens. The findings for research question one
imply that all mature individuals are not equal in the skills needed for
making policy judgements. The cause of this unequal ability is difficult to
assess clearly from this analysis alone. However, it suggests that all of the
subjects were not equally trained and experienced with respect to science and
society.161
An additional assessment of the data in the context of the second
research question revealed more information relevant to the variation in
reasoning patterns of these subteds. Fifteen of the 24 subjects in this study
exhibited one or more fallacious thinking patterns (FTP) in the reasoning they
used to explain their actions on the wetland waste water treatment issue. The
most prevalent FTPs were: 1) naive conception of argument structure; 2)
normative reasoning; 3) hasly generalizations; 4) altering the representation
of argument; 5) ad hominem argument. These five FTPs accounted for 81 of
the 89 total FTPs identified in the study.
The data from research questions one and two were analyzed qualita-
tively to determine whether any relationship could be shown between the
FTPs and the CTOs in the subject's responses. The results of a subsequent
regression analysis of the values for these two features indicated that an
apparent connection between them can be shown. The correlation coeffi-
cient is statistically significant (R = -0.70). TheR2coefficient is 48.49. The
strength of this relationship (p= <0.05) is moderate, and indicates that the
individuals who exhibited fallacies in their reasoning did not attain levels of
critical thinking as high as the individuals who did not exhibit fallacious
thinking.
The same fallacies were identified by Zeidler (1997), and others in
earlier studies of arguments used by students during classroom discussions.
Zeidler et al. (1992), defined fallacies of relevance as, "informally fallacious162
arguments that contain at least one premise that is logically irrelevant to its
conclusion, thereby, rendering the argument incapable of establishing its
conclusion as acceptable" (p. 441). The five fallacies that are the focus of
this discussion fit that paradigm on a corresponding basis. In each of these
palferns there is an error that is related to relevant use of evidence. A brief
description and discussion of those five FTPs follows.
Hasly generalization was described by Zeidler et at. (1992) as a
reasoning fallacy that may be employed by some students during discussions
when they are confronted with issues in which they have little interest or
experience. Zeidler (1997) argues that "people are often called on to
advance a line of inquiry into areas in which they have had little experience
(p. 491). When this is the case inadequate sampling may prevent an
individual from acquiring enough evidence regarding an issue, or he/she
may be "unclear about what constitutes sufficient or convincing evidence"
(Zeidler, 1997,p. 491).
Altering the representation of argument and naive conception of
argument structure are both patterns of fallacious reasoning that were
frequently observed in this study. These Iwo patterns have a similarily that
originates from a lack of argumentation skills. The recognition and correct
use of evidence and counter- evidence are important components of corn-
plete rhetorical arguments identified by Kuhn (1991). The conclusions of her
study imply that these components are acquired reasoning skills that may be163
learned through education and with practice. The results of the current study
add support to this notion.
Kuhn (1991) found that five students of philosophy who were working
on advanced degrees were the only group of sub jects in her study who were
able to construct complete and flawless rhetorical arguments for all three of
the topics that were presented to them. She concluded that skills of argu-
ment are more highly developed by individuals when they have education
and experience in using logic to generate arguments. She further contends
that these skills are usually apparent in the reasoning of those same individu-
als across disciplines. Her conclusions give support to the finding of Zeidler
(1 984a), who implicated "scientific literacy" of individuals as a factor for
resolving environmental dilemmas.
If this is true, we must assume that adult citizens who work as commu-
nily decision makers and who may cast votes on important political issues
are prepared for these important functions.If they have not, we must look
carefully at the reason.It is possible that our formal education system is a
component in the proper intellectual and social training of all citizens as they
develop into responsible adults.If the basic skills needed to make public
policy judgements are not well developed in high school and college
students, it may be difficult for these individuals to learn them during their
adult lives.It is important to recognize that in a democratic sociely all
citizens act as decision makers in some capacity. Public policy is not only164
influenced by officials who hold public office, but by any citizen who casts a
vote.
This yields more credibilily to the ideological goal of science literacy
expressed by Project 2061: That scientific habits of mind should be culti-
voted for all students to:
.deal sensibly with problems that often involve evidence, quantita-
tive considerations, logical arguments, and uncertainty; without the ability to
think critically and independently, citizens are easy prey to dogmatists, flim
flam artists, and purveyors of simple solutions to complex problems. (AAAS,
1989, p.13)
The situation may be rectified in several ways and at various levels.
Most importantly, our educators must take action at all levels. At the corn-
munily level, the problem is more complicated. Our leaders should be
presented with accurate information that will enhance them as decision
makers to function at the most effective level. To accomplish this we must be
cooperative as researchers, government leaders, private citizens and educa-
tors. An important starting point is to recognize that improvements are
possible, and to understand some of the possible problems that may be
resolved. We must confront this matter from two basic perspectives. First,
that critical thinking habits may be learned through education and practice.
Second, that habits of fallacious thinking are learned and reinforced by a
variety of social influences.165
Zeidler et al. (1992) described ad hominem argument as an attack on
a person with an opposing position on an issue, or an appeal to some
special circumstance.It may be that this pattern arises from a lack of skill in
developing a rational argument with relevant evidence to defend a position
on an issue, so the person who disagrees is attacked instead. Teachers must
be watchful for indications of this fallacious pattern, and help their students
understand why it is not an effective means to advance an argument favor-
ing or opposing a position on an issue.
Zeidler & Schafer(1984),implicated normative reasoning as a
mediating factor that influenced the reasoning of students as they discussed
socio-scientific dilemmas. They concluded that normative reasoning is not
just an intellectualizing skill, but may also be influenced by norm referenced
values of a specific social group and by past experiences. These group
values and personal experiences are often substituted as evidence to support
or refute a position on an issue. "Hence, many students will fall short of the
ability to distinguish correct from incorrect reasoning because of social
factors and vested interests which limit the open-mindedness necessary to
evaluate compelling counter arguments" (Zeidler et al.,1992, p. 444).
The questionnaire used to determine the initial core belief (ICB) scores
for the sublects in this study had a possible range of scores from-40to+40.
The assumption is made that a negative score indicates that the individual is
unsympathetic for environmental issues related to wetlands. Conversely, if a166
subject scored on the positive side of the scale, it indicates that the individual
has some concern for wetland environmental issues. Furthermore, the
strength of each subject's views, either positive or negative are indicated by
the numerical values of their ICB scores. The numerical value of the ICB
score for each subject may possibly be a predictor of fallacious reasoning.
The findings of this study indicate that the subjects can be divided into
two discrete categories associated with fallacious reasoning. While the
actual CTO scores appeared on a continuous scale, there was a more
important distinction between the subjects who exhibited FTPs and those who
did not. This is supported by the significant negative correlation of group
scores for CTO and FTP as well as the range of ICB scores for the subjects
with no FTPs. All of the nine subjects with zero FTPs had ICB scores located
within the interquartiles of the group distribution. All of the subjects with
some FTPs except two, had ICB scores located in the upper or lower
quartiles. A presumption is made that these subjects were biased either for
or against theconstructed wetland option.
No causal factors were conclusively identified, but the most frequent
FTPs and CTOs that were identified in the reasoning used by the subjects are
linked to the recognition or use of evidence.It is also suggested that per-
sonal bias either for or against the constructed wetland option may have
influenced the subjects who made errors in their reasoning. Accurate
assessment of evidence may be hindered by such personal bias. This couldbe a partial explanation for the distribution of the ICB scores. However,
there are many unanswered questions concerning this connection in regard
to causal factors.
The ICB scores for all subjects in this study were distributed in a
normal curve ranging between +2 and +39, indicating that each of them
has some level of concern for wetland environmental issues. The positive
regard for environmental issues is supported by the findings of Zeidler &
Schafer (1984), that groups of college students in both science and non-
science majors were equally concerned about environmental issues. How-
ever, when these same scores from the Iwocommunity groups were analyzed
separately, the distributions were skewed in the direction of the respective
group decisions. These skewed distributions areconsistent with the findings
of Satterfield & Gregory (1996) that even when people have different ideas
about specific policies, the majority are deeply concerned about the environ-
ment. This tends to support the concept of "a joint construction of shared
social knowledge" (Zeidler, 1997, p. 485).
While all subjects revealed distinct blends of personal core beliefs as
indicated by the ICB scores, the composite of each set of group scores was in
accordance with the respective group decisions.It is assumed that discourse
and constructive argument was part of the group process that led to the final
policy decisions for theIwocommunities. Zeidler (1997) states that when
individuals are cognitively challenged by the beliefs of others, "The resultingdiscourse leads to a joint construction of shared social knowledge (though
not necessarily shared beliefs)" (p. 485). The findings of this study support
this notion.
The distribution of the ICB scores for all of the subjects in this study,
indicates that a possible link may be shown between fallacious reasoning by
an individual and his or her ICB score. Asnoted above, most of the subjects
who displayed FTPS had ICB scores located in either the upper or lower
quartiles of the distribution. This suggests that these subjects had more
radical core beliefs about wetlands than those subjects with ICB scores in the
middle range. All of the subjects who displayed zero FTPs were located
within the range of the interquartiles of the ICB distribution.It is not clear
what this indicates, but a possible reason may be that those subjects with
zero FTPs were less biased in their decisions to support or oppose awetland
water treatment system.
If core beliefs do in fact generate fallacious reasoning as suggested by
this study, it follows that these core beliefs were learned at some point in the
development of an individual. The social construction of knowledge is
implicated by Zeidler (1997) as having a strong influence on the core beliefs
of individuals. He further suggests that there are multiple pathways that lead
to the social construction of knowledge. "This intellectual baggage has
developed over time both formally and informally through a plethora of
individual and social experiences" (Zeidler, 1997, p. 485). Some of the lCBs169
that influence fallacious thinking patterns may be deeply rooted in people
before they enter the school system.
The data were examined for patterns between the values of two
qualitative features of each sub jed's reasoning and their initial core belief
(1CB) scores.It is possible that the subjects with zero FTP wanted to find
concrete evidence before they made strong commitmentseither in support or
in opposition of the constructed wetland treatment method.There was no
clear pattern shown between the ICB scores and the CTO values. However,
an indirect connection issuggested by a significant negative correlation
between the FTP and CTO values.
There are strong implications that critical thinking habits are learned
by people at some point in their development.It is apparent that many
adults do not reason at higher levels than high school or college students.
This notion is strengthened by some of the differences that are found the
demographic review from Chapter IV. The participants in this study with
backgrounds in science or engineering referred to evidence and information
sources in ways that werenoticeably different than most of the subjects
without scientific backgrounds. The design of this study did not include an
analysis of the educational backgrounds of the participants, but this trend is
suggested by the anecdotal information that was obtained during the inter-
views.170
Directly connected is the assumption that individual core beliefs are
developed through various personal experiences and by social influences.
Many of the subjects in this study referred to personal experiences and
opinions as the evidence to support their decisions. Again, this was not the
main focus of this study, yet there appears to be a con nedion between
fallacious thinking, and a lack of ability to recognize or present evidence in
support of a personal decision. The habits related to this style of reasoning
must also be learned at some point during the development of an individual.
Limitations of the Study
It is recognized that the design of this study has a number of limita-
tions. Certain concessions were made in order to explore a public decision
process at the level of individual reasoning, and with as little observer effect
as possible. The sample size was small, and each interview lasted only 15-
30 minutes. The time spent with the sub,ects was intentionally short and to
the point in an attempt to coiled spontaneous responses. This approach has
some obvious limitations for obtaining samples of individual reasoning, but
the purpose was to keep the interaction between the subjects and the re-
searcher as straightforward as possible. The sample size was relatively small
because only certain members of the two groups were available to partici-
pate. This possibly had an effect of bias on the distribution patterns that
were found in the data. However, the selection of two groups with dissimilar
resolutions for similar problems may have mitigated this bias.171
Another point that should be acknowledged is the limited information
that is known about each subject.It was not feasible to accurately evaluate
the background of each subject in either experience or formal education
relevant to the decision context. Therefore, the only details about the history
of the subjects relevant to their decisions was self reported during the audio-
taped interviews. The length of time between the actual decision process for
each group and the interviews was approximately three years. This time
lapse must have surely affected each subject's recollection of his or her
thinking about the original decision. However, the main focus of this study
was on the reasoning of the subjects as they explained their decisions during
the interviews.
Implications for Future Public Decisions
It may be beneficial to discuss the findings of the current study with
respect to future public decisions to be made regarding socio-scientific
problems. The intent is not to evaluate the final outcome, but to analyze the
thinking that led to the two decisions. While the focus is the individual
reasoning of those citizens who made the public decisions, it is meaningful to
discuss the context in which these decisions were made. The waste water
problems of thetwocities had some similarities, but the local circumstances
were unique for a number of reasons. The regional and climatic differences
between City A and City B are one important point to consider.172
City A is located in southwestern Oregon, where the climate is arid
and the population density is low. In this region, water is a highly valued
resource, but land is plentiful and relatively low in cost. City B is located in
the Willamette Valley, where the opposite is true. In this region, there is a
much higher rate of rainfall, and runoff water is often a problem for cities to
be concerned with. Land is much higher in cost in the City B area, and there
is a local desire to reserve this resource for the future residential and indus-
trial needs of that community. In the City A vicinity there is a direct relation-
ship between the lack of water, and the prospects of future industrial or
residential development.
In the reasoning of the subjects from City A and City B it was apparent
that the specific local conditions helped to influence each city's final policy
decision regarding waste water treatment. Cost was obviously an important
factor that affected both of the final decisions. For City B the use of land for
a constructed wetland was problematic for two cost related reasons. First,
was the limited amount of land that was well situated; second, was the
preference for it to be used for other purposes. Another problem faced by
the City B group was the size of the wetland that would be required to handle
the potential volume of storm wafer overflow.
City A faced a different set of resource related problems. A major
factor was the future control of costs to obtain wafer to replace their waste
water, if they did not find a way to reclaim it through a satisfactory purifica-173
tion process. One primary option in the City A case was to send their waste
water to a regional plant and pay a processing fee, which could be increased
in the future. The ramification of City A sending the waste water somewhere
else went beyond the problem of cost alone. The output of their sewage
plant is the major source of water forIwolocal streams during the summer.
These streams are spawning streams for several species of fish, and they are
an important part of the natural ecosystems of the region.
Initially both the City A and the CityBgroups placed a high value on
using an environmentally friendly method to solve their waste water prob-
lems. In both cases there was pressure from the governmental regulatory
agencies to correct these problems from the perspective of preventing
pollution of natural streams. Yet, from both groups of subjects there was
some expression of anxiety about the inconsistency between the level of
environmental demands and the latitude allowed by the regulatory agencies
to implement a new and innovative type of technology. Directly related to
this is the lack of expert information that was presented to the two groups of
decision makers.
In the CityBdecision, the wetland treatment option was rejeded with
minimal consideration or discussion of environmental benefits that may be
derived from the use of constructed wetlands for the control and treatment of
waste water. Health and safety risks to the public were mentioned as a
major reason for rejecting this option because of the limited amount of174
information that was available about how this treatment method has been
used. Another obstacle was that wetland treatment technology is not recog-
nized by governmental agencies as an adequate method for water purifica-
tion. Because of the various unknown or unproven aspects of the wetland
treatment option, the general opinion of the City B subjects was that the
constructed wetland option has too many risk factors.
For the City A community, the wetland treatment option was favored
by an active and well informed group of private citizens. These people were
admittedly biased from the beginning of the city's decision process, and they
were an important source of information for the elected officials. This
information appeared to be significant in the final decision for City A to
adopt a waste water treatment plan that could utilize the constructed wetland
method. Several subjects in the City A group stated that a cost comparison
between the wetland and conventional waste water treatment methods,
showed no significant difference. Furthermore, this group believed that there
are added benefits for wildlife and fish habitat, reclaimed water for various
purposes, as well as the aesthetic and recreational value for the community.
The evidence or lack of it, used by the subjects in this study was
somewhat restricted by a limited availability or understanding of scientific
facts related to the constructed wetland option.It was also clear that the
decision makers faced a dilemma because of government policies that
imposed somewhat arbitrary environmental standards on one hand, yet175
restricted any remedial actions to the orthodox practices which have not
provided satisfactory results on the other. Some subjects stated that water
quality standards are approached in different ways by different government
agencies. For example, one may be interested only in the pollution aspects,
while another may be only interested in the volume of stream flow.
There was some concern that wafer quality was not approached by
the various regulatory agencies in a more unified manner. It was suggested
by some subjects that water pollution problems should be solved on a more
regional basis with attention given to sources of pollution other than munici-
pal wastes. Some other sources of that were mentioned by subjects were
agricultural and residential runoff, as well as industrial wastes. The majority
of the subjects were perplexed by such inconsistencies as strict guidelines for
the preservation of wetlands in relation to land development, yet there isa
limited allowance by government agencies to use wetlands for themanage-
ment and purification of waste water.
It is apparent that the decision makers from both cities were faced
with complex issues. This study was focused on the reasoning of the decision
makers as individuals. Yet, certain other equally important influences must
not be overlooked such as the social and cost factors. The regional varia-
tions and the multiple political jurisdictions were obvious considerations in
the final decisions of both cities.If is a difficult balancing act for community
leaders to work under such restrictions while attempting to respond to the176
specific needs of local citizens. In short, these decision makers must face
certain global environmental problems within the limits of localresources.It
would be helpful to consider these facts in the future.
The demands for all regulatory agencies should be coordinated
before compliance is expected from local political bodies suchas the two
cities in this study.It is also very important for local governments to compile
complete and accurate information to present to citizens regarding environ-
mental policy decisions.It should be stressed that several alternatives must
be provided with legitimate evidence that individual decision makersmay use
to make informed choices. In order to accomplish this, the community
leaders must understand how each decision maker views the local situation
as well as the global concepts that will have some influence on the policy
decision. Any lack of information or personal understanding will diminish
the merit of the final group decision.
Recommendations for Educational Practice
The conclusions of the current study lend support to the contentions of
other researchers (Zeidler, I 984a; Zeidler & Schafer, 1984; Zeidler et aL,
1992; Kuhn et al., 1988; Kuhn, 1991; Zeidler, 1997) thatmany people do
not have adequate skill in using evidence to support a position on an issue.
As was fittingly stated by Zeidler et al. (1992), "...what qualifies as accept-
able evidence often differs across academic disciplines. Students, therefore,
become unclear about what constitutes sufficient or appropriate evidence"177
(p. 442). With this in mind, it would be plausible for teachers of science and
other disciplines to spend substantial instructional time helping their students
develop this skill.
Zeidler has advocated the use of short learning sessions in science
classes, where the students are encouraged to discuss and debate issues
relevant to the lesson content. This practice would require the students to
develop informal arguments to support or opposea particular viewpoint on
an issue. During these group discussions many opportunities would arise
where the teachers could help their students identify and define appropriate
evidence in order to develop rational arguments. Prudence should be used
lest the students become discipline biased or subjective in their effortsto meet
the teacher's personal preferences (Zeidler et al., 1992).
The use of these short learning sessions would be helpful in the
curriculum of most academic disciplines. However, it is essential that teach-
ers convey their epistemological expectations clearly to the students in the
context of the specific class content (Zeidler et al.,1 992). Of major impor-
tance is a clear understanding about what constitutes appropriate evidence
in the various disciplines. A starting point for all contentareas would be for
the teacher to open a discussion regarding the definition of evidence. As
might be expected, each student will define evidenceon the basis of his or
her own personal background.Several of the definitions of evidence should be discussed relative toa
variety of social and scientific contexts. For example, legal evidence in a civil
court is not the same as in a criminal case. Likewise, the scientific evidence
recognized by biologists is not the same as for physical or social scientists.
After the students are made aware that multiple types of evidence are
recognized within a variety of decision contexts, they may be allowed to
develop arguments by using the correct type of evidence to support or
oppose a variety of issues.
It is vital to inform the students that suitable evidence may be pre-
sented in various forms such as empirical, experimental or theoretical. They
may also be advised that evidence should be described in a language that is
appropriate for the particular decision context. The primary objective should
be for students to learn not to rely on just personal experiences for evidence
to advance claims. But, rather that, "they could strengthen their positions by
pursuing further gathering of evidence appropriate to that discipline (Zeidler
et al., 1992). In any case, educators may use these suggestions to enhance
their current teaching practices, and hopefully utilize their own creativity to
build on these basic ideas.
This practice would enhance the performance based approach
recommended by Oregon Department of Education during the 1999-2000
school year. Those enhancement goals for effective science instruction
include the use of inquiry as a method for teaching the understanding of179
scientific concepts to students. Attention to what constitutes good evidence
should be included along with the suggested instructional methods for
development of thinking skills and attitudes. Desirable scientific attitudes
such as skepticism, respect for reasoning and curiosily would surely be
strengthened by helping students acquire a clear understanding of evidence
in a variety of contexts. The ability to recognize and evaluate specific types of
evidence is an essential skill that is needed by all citizens in a society where
public decisions often require some understanding of technical information.
As was stated by Zeidler et al. (1992), the implementation of such
changes is "contingent upon the adequate education of preservice and
inservice science teachers in critical thinking and reasoning skills" (p. 447).
They further argue that these patterns of thought and thinking skills develop
over many years, and that changes will not occur from simply informing
teachers of their fallacious or inadequate reasoning. Changes at the college
or university level must be subtle to minimize any resistance and to achieve
long term improvements in the instructional methods and reasoning of
teachers in our public school system.It was suggested by Zeidler et al.
(1992), that "within the context discussions concerning the classroom use of
various scientifically or technologically based societal issues, teachers could
be presented with hypothetical samples of students' thoughts (for analysis)
which exhibit various fallacious arguments" (p. 447). The same instructional
techniques could be easily adapted to other academic areas and integrated:1
courses at the post-secondary level. All of the above might also be true in
regard to other adults who are not teachers. All of our citizens makemany
personal and societal decisions in their daily lives,It is quite possible that
many adults in our communities would be interested in workshops or contin-
uing education courses designed to improve critical thinking and reasoning
skills.
Suggestions for Future Research
It is important to note that this was an exploratory study. The infer-
ences are not conclusive nor should they be generalized beyond the context
of this study. The results should only be used as guides for additional
inquiry. The designs for any future studies may be replications of the current
study or a similar design, but in the context of different environmental and
social issues. The total amount of time each subject spent in thegroup
process would give more indication of his or her personal commitment to the
final public decision (Bolan & Nuttall, 1975).It would be a simple matter to
ask each subject to estimate the amount of time spent attending andprepar-
ing for the group meetings. The subjects could also be asked somemore
detailed questions about how they acquired their information about the
decision issue.
If at all possible, a study of the process as itoccurs in real time would
be valuable. Future studies should be more focused on the specific points
that were indicated in the data from this study. One suggestion is for further181
investigation into any relationship between the level of critical thinking used
by the subjects, and the lype and level of formal education they havere-
ceived. Future studies should include interview questions regarding the
formal education of the subjects. Each subject could then be rated according
to the amount and lype of course work he or she completed during high
school and college. A numerical value for the rating of each subject would
be used as another variable to correlate with the CTO variable.
It would be worthwhile to generate more studies regarding the effects
of initial core beliefs on the frequency of the recurrent fallacious thinking
patterns identified in the current study. A more detailed analysis of the 20
questions used to formulate the ICB scores may provide more understanding
of the causes and the strength of personal conviction in eachresponse. The
responses given by each subject for each of the 20 questions should be
factor analyzed to identify any patterns or similarities between subjects.
Causal relationships could then be explored between the patterns ofanswers
on the questionnaire, and the levels of performance on the FTP and ClO
variables.
An additional inquiry about how social factors contribute to the
origination and the strength of core beliefs might provide some valuable
insight. A questionnaire could be constructed to ascertain subjectivilyor
academic bias that the subjects might reveal while defining their personal
understanding of the appropriate evidence relevant to various issues. The182
questions should address why the sub jeds believe as they do, and how they
acquired their beliefs.
The basis of individual differences in basic core beliefs is a complex
area to explore. Yet, in order to gain more insight about how members of
our sociely make important public decisions, it would be enlightening to
understand the essence of individual bias. Social causes might be as basic
as the ideas learned from friends, family members, teachers, ministers, or
from the authors of numerous articles and books that each person has
contact with during their lifetime. The current study has affirmed that the
core beliefs of individuals effect their decisions as adults.If appears that
personal bias does not change simultaneously with the physical and mental
growth of an individual, but only with suitable instruction and training.If
educators could be supplied with more information about these social
influences, it would enhance their efforts to cultivate scientific habits of mind
in their students and to attain the ultimate goal of scientific literacy in our
adult population.183
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APPENDIX AJuly30, 1998
Dear Respondent:
I am a doctoral student from the School of Education at Oregon State University. I
am preparing a study for my dissertation. The main focus of my study is the use of
constructed wetlands to purify municipal wastewater. I am interested in your views
about the use of constructed wetlands in conjunction with the existing facilities in
your city. It is my understanding that this idea was discussed by some of yourlocal
citizens. You are being asked to take part in my study because your name is listed
in the records of your city as a participant in the decision process. It would be
helpfiul if you choose to participate. This would require 30 minutes of your time.
All information that you may provide is strictly confidential. Your responses will
be used for analysis of general viewpoints and your participation will remain
anonymous. You will be asked to fill out a short questionnaire and then discuss
your views in a recorded interview. What you say about wetlands or wastewater
treatment will be your choice. The audio tape will be transcribed and your identity
will remain anonymous. I will contact you by telephone in the next 30 days to
request an appointment for an interview at your convenience. You may choose to
abandon the study at any time.
If you have any questions, please call my advisor, Nothi Lederman at (541) 737-
1819. If he is not available when you call, please leave a message and hewill
return your call.
Sincerely,
Jerry Nelson
Doctoral Studentlvii
APPENDIX B191
Please read the following 20 statements and mark a response that is closest
to your personal belief about each statement.
1)Wetlands have been declining steadily in North America.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
2)It is generally a good idea to reduce the amount of wetland areas and
develop them for agriculture or other purposes.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
3)The decline of wetlands in North America has been detrimental to
wildlife habitat.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
4)Wetlands may offer a viable means of intercepting and breaking down
sewage which can harm fish and other aquatic life.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
5)Wetland wastewater treatment systems have capital costs similar to
those of conventional wastewater treatment systems.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
6)Wetlands in the United States are not important for wildlife habitat.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
7)The decline of wetlands in North America has been detrimental to
water quality.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
8)Plants that grow in wetland ecosystems are not beneficial.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree192
9)A constructed wetland coupled with a settling pond to remove solids
can effedively purify sewage, andprovide some recreational value
such as hunting, fishing, birdwatching, photography, etc.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
10)Wetland wastewater treatment systems are a good example of how
sewage treatment and ecosystem preservation canbe achieved without
sacrificing one for the other.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
11)Wetlands have been over rated for their capabilily to filter and purify
water.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
12)Mosquitoes and other aquatic inseds may be controlled by stocking
wetlands with fish that feed on their larva.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
13)Bulrushes and cattails, the most common plants in a temperate zone
wetlands can break down pesticides, industrial solvents, and other
organic molecules as well as remove most of the heavy metals from
polluted water.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
14)Wetlands should be considered little more than breeders of disease
and pests.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
15)It is unlikely that a wetland wastewater treatment system can be de-
signed to purify sewage well enough to meet stringent water quality
standards.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
16)Wetlands provide valuable habitat which can proted endangered or
threatened species of wildlife.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree193
17)Some cities and towns can expect to save substantial capital costs by
utilizing wetland wastewater treatment because it iscosfeffective.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
18)Wetlands are relatively useless unless they can be drained, filled and
put into more productive commercial use.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
19)Wetland wastewater treatment has not been proven to be an effective
and efficient process for purifying water.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree
20)Wetland water treatment is a high-maintenance and costly method that
could not significantly improve the purification of wastewater in the
United States.
strongly agree () agree () disagree () strongly disagree